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Abstract 
We exploit changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a program to support jobs through 
investment subsidies. European rules determine whether an area is eligible for subsidies, and we 
construct instrumental variables for area eligibility based on parameters of these rule changes. 
Areas eligible for higher subsidies significantly increased jobs and reduced unemployment. A 
ten-percentage point increase in the maximum investment subsidy stimulates a 10% increase in 
manufacturing employment. This effect exists solely for small firms – large companies accept 
subsidies without increasing activity. There are positive effects on investment and employment 
for incumbent firms but not Total Factor Productivity.  
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The Great Recession brought industrial policy back into fashion.
1
  Governments around the 
world granted huge subsidies to private firms - most dramatically in financial services - but also 
in other sectors like autos. Business support policies are not new, however. Most governments 
offer subsidies that claim to protect jobs, reduce unemployment and foster productivity, 
particularly in disadvantaged geographical areas. For example, the US spends around $40 to 
$50bn per annum on local development policies (Moretti, 2011). Increasing geographical 
polarization has fostered social and political pressure for more place-specific policies. However, 
despite the ubiquity of such schemes, rigorous micro-econometric evaluations of the causal 
effects of these policies are rare.  This is unfortunate given the mounting evidence on the 
persistent effect of negative economic shocks on local communities and the social and political 
implications of these pockets of disadvantage (e.g. Autor, Hansen and Dorn, 2016). 
A major concern is that these programs might simply finance activities that firms would 
have undertaken anyway. The consensus among economists is that industrial policy usually fails, 
but the econometric evidence is surprisingly sparse. As Rodrik (2007) emphasizes, many of these 
policies are targeted on firms and industries that would be in difficulties even in the absence of 
the program, so naïve OLS estimates may miss any positive effects.
2
  
We tackle the identification problem by exploiting a policy experiment that induced 
exogenous changes in the eligibility criteria governing whether plants in economically 
disadvantaged areas could receive investment subsidies from a major investment subsidy 
program in the UK.  This program was called “Regional Selective Assistance” (RSA), but 
similar support programs exist in other European Union (EU) countries. Crucially for our 
identification strategy, there are rules governing the geographical areas that are eligible to 
receive aid from the UK government that are determined by the EU. This is different from the 
US where the Federal government cannot prevent states from offering such business 
inducements (e.g. Felix and Hines, 2013). We focus on a major policy change in the formula 
driven rules in the year 2000 because we have detailed administrative and institutional data 
before and after the change. Holding area characteristics fixed in the pre-policy change period 
we exploit only the change in the EU policy parameters - the “weights” given to the different 
observable factors (e.g. unemployment and per capita GDP) determining which geographical 
areas were defined to be more economically disadvantaged. This enables us to estimate the 
                                                 
1
 Here, we are using the term “industrial policy” in its broad sense, but our focus in the rest of the paper is on one 
important component of that policy that directs investment subsidies to private sector firms in an attempt to 
revitalize disadvantaged geographical areas. 
2
 For examples see Krueger and Tuncer (1982), Beason and Weinstein (1996) and Lawrence and Weinstein (2001).  
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causal effect of the program on employment and unemployment (and also plant net entry, 
investment, and productivity). Our data set is constructed by linking rich administrative panel 
data on the population of UK establishments and the population of RSA program participants. 
We reach four substantive conclusions. First, there is an economically large and statistically 
significant program effect - a 10 percentage point increase in an area’s rate of maximum 
investment subsidy causes about a 10% increase in manufacturing employment and a 4% 
decrease in aggregate unemployment. These effects are underestimated if endogeneity is ignored, 
as the areas that become eligible for the program are those which, on average, experience 
negative shocks and whose establishments would otherwise perform badly, even in the absence 
of the policy. This conclusion is robust to many controls including other place-based policies 
such as EU Structural Funds (for which we also develop a rules based IV). Second, we show that 
these positive effects are not purely due to substitution of jobs towards eligible areas and away 
from neighboring (ineligible) areas. Third, we find that the positive treatment effect is confined 
to establishments in smaller firms (e.g. with under 50 workers). We suggest that this is due to 
larger firms being more able to “game” the system and take the subsidy without changing their 
level of economic activity. Finally, there appear to be no additional effects on productivity after 
controlling for the program’s positive investment effects.  
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature on the causal impact of place-based policies, 
see Kline and Moretti (2014a) for a survey and Kline and Moretti (2014b) on long-run effects on 
manufacturing jobs from the Tennessee Valley Authority policy. US Empowerment Zones - 
neighborhoods receiving substantial Federal assistance in the form of tax breaks and job 
subsidies - have been examined by Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013) who identify strong 
positive employment and wage effects, with only moderate deadweight losses.
3
 Towards the end 
of the paper (subsection VI.D) we provide explicit comparisons of the size of our effects to those 
in the place-based policy literature and show that the larger magnitudes we find are likely to be 
rooted in methodological and program differences. 
We also relate to a broader literature concerning evaluations of business support policies and 
place-based interventions (see Neumark and Simpson, 2014 for a review). Several papers 
                                                 
3
 Holmes (1998), Albouy (2009) and Wilson (2009) consider other place-based tax policies, while Wren and Taylor 
(1999), Bronzini and de Blasio (2006), Martin et al. (2011) and Becker et al. (2010, 2012a, b) provide evidence for 
regional policy in Europe. Gibbons, Overman and Sarvimaki (2011), and Einio and Overman (2015) discuss similar 
place based schemes in the UK, while Gobillon et al. (2012) and Mayer et al. (2017) provide estimates for France 
and Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) for Italy. In contrast to RSA, which targets specific firms within eligible areas, 
these schemes are generally not discretionary (i.e. subject to the firm meeting some basic requirements). In addition 
to this substantive difference in the nature of the scheme, our paper is also unique in using exogenously imposed 
changes in area eligibility rules to identify the causal effects of the policy.   
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consider direct research subsidies to industrial R&D. Unlike the generally positive assessments 
of R&D tax credits (e.g. Fowkes et al., 2015), the evidence on these direct subsidies is mixed 
(e.g. the survey in Jaffe and Le, 2015).
4
 Several recent studies have used Regression 
Discontinuity designs to assess the causal effects of direct grants. For example, both Howell 
(2017) on the US Small Business Innovation Research program and Bronzini and Iachini (2014) 
on Italian data use a proposal’s application score by an independent committee as the running 
variable when analyzing the effects of receiving R&D subsidies. Interestingly, these studies are 
consistent with us in that they uncover much larger positive program effects on investment for 
small firms.  
Our paper is not the first to look at the impact of the RSA program. Unfortunately, most of 
the previous evaluation studies are based on “industrial survey” techniques where senior 
managers at a sample of assisted firms are asked to give their subjective assessment of what the 
counterfactual situation would have been had they not received the grant (e.g. see National Audit 
Office, 2003, for a survey). In contrast to the OLS approaches discussed above that are likely to 
underestimate positive policy effects, these survey techniques typically over-estimate program 
impacts since firms receiving money are likely to exaggerate the scheme’s benefits. Some other 
studies have also used firm-level econometric techniques to evaluate the direct impact of RSA.
5
  
Relative to existing studies our contribution is to exploit a policy rules change experiment on the 
population of plants to identify causal effects.  
Finally, there is a large literature on the impact of capital and labor taxes (e.g. Mirrlees, 
2010).
6
 Unlike our RSA program, however, these general tax rules tend to be available nation-
wide rather than place based, and automatic rather than at the discretion of an agency. They are 
also more likely to engender general equilibrium effects than the RSA policy that amounts to less 
than 0.1% of aggregate UK investment. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I describes the policy in more detail and 
outlines how eligibility changes over time. Section II sets out a simple theoretical framework to 
help interpret the results and Section III describes the econometric modelling strategy. Section 
                                                 
4
 See Takalo et al. (2013) or Einio (2014) for recent contributions. 
5
 For example, Devereux et al. (2007) look at Greenfield investments by foreign-owned multinationals and UK-
owned multi-plant groups using the largest RSA grant offers. They find positive, but quantitatively tiny effects on 
multinational location decisions. Hart et al. (2008) also focus on multinationals using a Heckman selection model. 
Jones and Wren (2004) and Harris and Robinson (2005) look at differences in survival between RSA recipients and 
non-recipients.  
6
 A recent example is Zwick and Mahon (2017) who find substantial effects of temporary tax incentives on 
investment using shifts in accelerated depreciation. Interestingly, the results are especially large for smaller firms, 
which is broadly consistent with our findings as reported below. 
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IV describes the data, Section V reports our results at the area level and Section VI at the plant 
and firm level. Section VII provides conclusions. In the Online Appendices we report more 
details on the RSA policy (Appendix A), the changes in EU rules (Appendix B), data details 
(Appendix C), aggregation issues (Appendix D), other regional policies (Appendix E), further 
econometric results (Appendix F) and cost per job estimates (Appendix G). 
 
I. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: DESCRIPTION OF THE REGIONAL 
SELECTIVE ASSISTANCE (RSA) PROGRAM 
I.A Overview  
Regional Selective Assistance started in 1972 and from the early 1980s was the main business 
support scheme in the UK. The program provided discretionary grants to firms in disadvantaged 
areas characterized by low levels of per capita GDP and high unemployment (“Assisted Areas”). 
It was designed to “create and safeguard employment” in the manufacturing sector. Firms 
applied to the government with investment projects they wished to finance such as building a 
new plant or modernizing an existing one. If successful, the government financed up to 35% of 
the cost of an investment project.
7
 
Because RSA had the potential to distort competition and trade, it had to comply with 
European Union state aid legislation. European law, except in certain cases, prohibits this type of 
assistance. In particular, Article 87(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam allows for state aid only in 
support of the EU’s regional development objectives. The guidelines designate very 
disadvantaged “Development (subsequently called Tier 1) Areas” in which higher rates of 
investment subsidy can be offered, and somewhat less disadvantaged “Intermediate (Tier 2) 
Areas” where lower subsidy rates were offered. There was an upper threshold to the investment 
subsidy called Net Grant Equivalent (NGE)
8
, which sets a maximum proportion of a firm’s 
investment that can be subsidized by the government. These EU determined maximum NGE 
rates differed over time and across geographical areas. 
Since the formula that determines which areas were eligible (and at which NGE rate) was set 
about every seven years by the European Commission for the whole of the EU and not by the 
UK government, this mitigates concern of policy endogeneity. Although the overall budget for 
                                                 
7
 Although the structure of RSA is largely the same at time of writing, it has been rebranded several times after the 
end of our sample period (e.g. as the “Selective Finance for Investment Scheme” in 2004) so we refer to it in the 
past tense. In Wales and Scotland it retains the name of RSA. 
8 
The Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) of aid is the benefit accruing to the recipient from the grant after payment of 
taxes on company profits. RSA grants must be entered in the accounts as income and are made subject to tax. 
Details for calculations of NGEs are available in EU Official Journal C74/19 10.03.1998. 
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RSA is determined by the UK and not the EU, the UK had to conform to EU rules when 
deciding which areas are eligible to receive RSA. Changes to area-level eligibility are driven by 
EU wide policy parameters and are therefore the key form of identification in our paper. 
I.B Changes in eligibility over time 
We focus on the change in the map of the areas eligible for RSA in 2000 using the period 
between 1997 and 2004, before and after the policy change. Although there have been changes in 
the area maps in 1984, 1993, 2000 and 2006 our access to program participation data does not 
extend beyond 2004 and we were unable to obtain precise information on the criteria for being 
an assisted area before 1993, so we cannot construct the rules change IV for the 1993 changes. 
Since there are also changes in the collection of total employment data before 1997 (see 
Appendix A), we mainly use 1997 as the first year (although we present OLS estimates of 
manufacturing employment in all years from 1986 onwards in a robustness exercise).  
Figure 1 shows the maps of assistance in the pre-2000 period (left hand side) and post 2000 
period (right hand side). There was considerable change in the areas that could receive assistance 
and the level of subsidy they were able to receive. Whether an area is eligible for any RSA is 
determined by a series of quantitative indicators of disadvantage which changed over time but 
always included per capita GDP and unemployment. For the 2000 change, the data used to 
determine which areas were eligible dated from 1998 and earlier. Although the EU publishes 
which indicators it uses, it does not give the exact policy parameters (the weights) on these 
indicators which determine eligibility, but we can estimate these parameters econometrically (see 
Section III).  
This institutional set-up implies that an area can switch eligibility status for at least three 
reasons. First, there may be a change over time in the indicators used or the relative importance 
(weights) of each indicator. Second, changes in the average EU GDP per capita can push areas in 
or out of eligibility even if nothing changes in the area itself. For example, when the formerly 
Communist states in Eastern Europe joined the EU, average EU GDP per capita fell, meaning 
some poorer UK areas were no longer eligible for subsidies from the RSA program. Third, the 
economic position of an area changes over time even for a fixed set of rules.  The first two 
reasons for eligibility changes are clearly exogenous to area unobservables, but the third is not. It 
helps that the information determining eligibility is pre-determined as it is lagged at least two 
(and up to ten) years before the policy change and therefore many years prior to current 
outcomes. However, there may be unobservable area trends that are correlated with eligibility 
status and outcomes. Areas which are in long-run decline are more likely to have falling 
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employment and output and are therefore more likely to become eligible for the program, 
generating a downward bias on a difference-in-differences estimate of the program effect on 
jobs. Alternatively, there could be a temporary negative shock. This would increase the 
probability of an area becoming eligible, but it would also generate an upward bias on the 
treatment effect as the area mean reverts (an “Ashenfelter Dip” problem). To deal with 
endogeneity we focus on using only changes in the cross EU policy rules to construct 
instrumental variables for program participation and ignore all changes in area characteristics. As 
described more formally in Section III, we fix the area characteristics relevant for eligibility prior 
to the policy change and interact these with the changes in the EU wide policy parameters. 
I.C Formal criteria for receipt of RSA investment subsidies 
RSA was heavily targeted at the manufacturing sector – less than 10% of RSA spending was to 
non-manufacturing firms. The grants were discretionary, and firms could only receive grants if 
the supported project was undertaken in an “Assisted Area” and involved capital expenditure on 
property, plant or machinery. These were the most clearly verifiable aspects. In addition, the 
formal criteria stipulated that the project: (a) should be expected to lead to the creation of new 
employment or directly protect jobs of existing workers which would otherwise be lost and (b) 
would not have occurred in the absence of the government funding (“additionality”). Location, 
which forms the basis for our instrumental variable, is objective, clearly defined and enforceable. 
The other criteria are more subjective and are based on the government’s ability to assess the 
counterfactual situation of what would have happened in the absence of government support. For 
example, a firm could cut jobs but claim that it would have reduced employment by even more 
without support. It is difficult for bureaucrats to make such an assessment of this claim with 
accuracy. The ability of a firm to “game” the system may be particularly high for larger firms 
who can increase employment at subsidized plants at the expense of employment in unsubsidized 
plants that did not receive RSA. 
 
II. MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF AN INVESTMENT SUBSIDY 
II.A Effects of the RSA policy on Capital investment 
What are the likely effects of RSA on investment and employment in an eligible area? Initially 
we consider the effects of a firm receiving RSA in a world without financial frictions. The 
investment grant ( ) reduces the cost of capital facing the firm. To calculate the magnitude of 
this effect we can use the Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital framework (e.g. King, 1974). We 
consider the effects of a perturbation in the path of a firm’s capital stock. If the firm is behaving 
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optimally, then the change in after tax profits resulting from a one unit change in the capital 
stock will equal the unit cost of capital. Under RSA, depreciation allowances are granted on total 
investment, so we can write the cost of capital,  , as (e.g. Ruane, 1982): 
(1)                                                                      
(1 )
1
r  
 

 
 

                                                                           
where   is the depreciation rate,  is the statutory corporate tax rate, r is the interest rate and   
is the depreciation allowance. It is clear from equation (1) that the cost of capital is falling in the 
generosity of the investment grant (
1
r
 

 
 
 < 0). Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the possible 
program effect by assuming that the level of the capital stock of a firm is determined from the 
intersection of capital demand (a downward sloping marginal revenue productivity of capital 
curve, MRPK) and a horizontal tax-adjusted user cost of capital (the supply of funds curve). 
Without any subsidy, the cost of capital is ρ1 and a firm’s capital stock is K1. The RSA program 
reduces the effective cost of capital to ρ2 and capital rises to K2.  
As discussed above, RSA attempts to target marginal investments. If only marginal 
capital projects obtain funding, the change in the capital stock is ΔK = K2 - K1 at a taxpayer cost 
of (K2 - K1) (ρ1 - ρ2). More realistically, the government has imperfect monitoring ability and so 
will achieve a lower increase in capital as some of the costs are diverted to funding infra-
marginal investments that the firm would have made even in the absence of government 
intervention. The extreme case is where the government has zero monitoring ability and the firm 
simply accepts the subsidy without making any additional investment. The level of capital stays 
the same, but there is a direct transfer of funds from the taxpayer to shareholders. The firm will 
not voluntarily make investments that earn a rate of return below the outside market cost of 
capital
9
 and can effectively lend out any excess subsidies at this market rate. It is likely that the 
government’s monitoring problem is particularly severe for large firms which will typically be 
conducting many different types of investments, and an outside agency will have difficulty in 
assessing whether any grant is truly additional or not.  
Now consider a world with imperfect capital markets such that we have a hierarchy of 
finance model (e.g. Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Here a firm may be financially constrained if 
it must externally finance investment from debt or equity rather than relying on internal funds. In 
this case, the cost of capital/supply of funds curve is not horizontal as in Panel A, but becomes 
                                                 
9
  MRPK<
(1 )
1
r 





, i.e. the value of  in equation (1) when   = 0. 
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upward sloping when firms need external finance. This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 
where we consider two firms indicated by different MRPK curves. A financially unconstrained 
firm has a schedule “MRPK (unconstrained)” which intersects the flat part of the supply of funds 
curve, and can finance all investments from internal funds. By contrast, a financially constrained 
firm has schedule “MRPK (constrained)” and has to rely in part on more expensive external 
funds. An identical subsidy will generate more investment from the financially constrained firm 
than from the unconstrained firm.
10
 This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 (ΔK’ > ΔK) and can 
be seen from considering the cross partial derivative of equation (1): 
2 1
1r

 

 
  
 < 0. For 
firms facing an effective interest rate (r) higher than the risk free rate due to financing 
constraints, the marginal effect of a subsidy on the cost of capital is greater and so the effect on 
investment is larger. If small firms are more likely to be financially constrained, this is a second 
reason over and above lower monitoring difficulties why the program may have a larger 
treatment effect on small firms. As with the case of perfect financial markets, if the government 
cannot target marginal investments there will be zero effect on the financially unconstrained 
firms. 
 
II.B Effects of the RSA policy on labor 
One of the objectives of the program is to raise employment. Consider as a benchmark a constant 
returns to scale production function F(K, L) where K  = capital and L = labor with perfect 
competition in all markets. The Marshallian conditions for derived demand are (e.g. see 
Hamermesh, 1990): 
( )L Ks     
Where   =  is the elasticity of labor with respect to the user cost of capital,  = the 
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, Ks  = the share of capital in total costs and η is 
the (absolute) price elasticity of product demand. The sign of the effect will depend on whether 
the scale effect (determined by η) is larger than the substitution effect (determined by ). The 
marginal effect of the investment subsidy is:  
                                                 
10
 Note that the program is not simply directed lending which will only have an effect on financially constrained 
firms (e.g. Banerjee and Duflo, 2014), but rather a directed subsidy which in general will also have effects on 
financially unconstrained firms. 
L
ln
ln

 L


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ln ln
( )K
L
s

 
 
 
 
 
 
This shows that, in general, the subsidy could have a negative effect on employment, even if it 
increases capital. If    an increase in the investment subsidy will reduce labor. On the other 
hand, if    there is a positive effect on employment and the magnitude of this effect will be 
larger if capital is more important (high Ks ). This is something we will examine empirically. 
Finally, the formal rules of receiving RSA require that jobs must be created or 
safeguarded.  In terms of the theory, this involves firms trying to convince government that they 
will not simply recycle funds (as discussed above) and that capital is a complement for labor (i.e. 
sigma is less than eta). Of course, the ability of the government to assess, monitor and enforce 
this might be doubted. Firms could still cut jobs but claim that employment would have fallen by 
even more in the absence of the subsidy 
 
IIC. General Equilibrium effects 
Total expenditure on RSA was about £164m per year in our sample period, which constitutes 
only a tiny fraction (0.065%) of total UK investment.
11
 Consequently, although there may be 
general equilibrium effects on asset prices and wages (e.g. Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008) these are 
unlikely to be large. Nevertheless, since there may be some equilibrium price effects in local 
areas we also examine the effect of the program on wages and population density. We find these 
effects to be insignificantly different from zero.  
 
IID. Summary of Model 
We take several predictions from the theory to the data. First, the investment subsidy should 
have positive effects on investment. Second, in the model the investment subsidy will have a 
positive effect on employment if scale effects are sufficiently large and the magnitude of any 
positive employment effect will be larger when the capital share is higher. Third, we may expect 
that the policy has a larger effect on small firms because: (i) big firms can more easily “game” 
the system by using RSA for investment they would have done anyhow; and (ii) smaller firms 
are more likely to be financially constrained. We find support for all of these predictions in the 
data. 
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 For example, RSA expenditure as 0.065% of total investment in 2004. Online Appendix Table A1 contains some 
descriptive statistics including the fact that total RSA grants were £149m in 2004 compared to £227bn spent in gross 
fixed capital formation (ONS, 2014).  
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III. ECONOMETRIC MODELLING STRATEGY 
Our basic approach is to estimate the policy effects in a small-scale geographical area (“wards” 
that are similar in population size to a US zip code). We also present results at both a higher 
level of aggregation – travel to work areas (TTWAs) to assess spillovers (do jobs just get 
displaced from other areas?) and lower levels of aggregation (plant and firm-level) to assess 
issues around intensive vs. extensive margins of adjustment and heterogeneity of the treatment 
effects by firm size. There are 10,737 wards and 322 TTWAs in our dataset covering the whole 
of Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland). Since the eligibility varies at the ward level and 
the number of wards is stable over time, the ward is a natural unit of observation to focus on. We 
write the relationship of interest as: 
(2)                                                  , 1 , ,r t r t r t r ty NGE v                                                            
Where ,r tNGE  (Net Grant Equivalent) is the key policy variable and is defined as the maximum 
investment subsidy available in ward area r in year t and ranges from zero to 35%. The main 
outcome, ,r ty , we examine is employment – a variable which is available at all levels of 
aggregation. However, we also examine unemployment and various other outcomes (e.g. 
investment, output, productivity and entry/exit).
12
 Unemployment is useful to examine as we can 
assess whether increased employment is coming from drawing in people who were previously 
not working. The r  is an area fixed effect, t  are time dummies and ,r tv  is an error term. 
A concern with estimating equation (2) is that ,r tNGE could be endogenous if areas are 
selected into the policy because they have experienced negative shocks. The wards which 
experienced a change in eligibility may have done so because of unobserved contemporaneous 
changes in the area that are correlated with our outcome variables. But, as discussed in Section I, 
eligibility and the level of maximum investment subsidy in an area also depend on EU-wide 
rules so changes in the parameters of these policy rules can be used to construct instrumental 
variables.  
To examine this formally, denote eligibility in 2000 (and afterwards) as a discrete variable 
Sr,00 and similarly eligibility for the 1993-2000 period as Sr,93 . So ,rS   = 1 if the area is eligible 
in period {93,00}  and zero otherwise. The EU rules are explicit that eligibility in 2000 
depends on a vector of area characteristics such as unemployment and per capita GDP relative to 
                                                 
12
 Unlike the US, the UK Office for National Statistics does not collect data on productivity, investment and wages 
at the plant level. The surveys are conducted at the firm (“reporting unit”) level, including for multi-plant firms. This 
means that we cannot accurately calculate productivity measures at very detailed geographical level (e.g. ward). 
12 
 
the EU average. The EU also explicitly gives the period over which these data are dated which is 
from 1998 and earlier due to lags in data collection. Similarly, the policy states the (lagged) 
characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993 (which were dated 1991 and earlier). Some of 
the characteristics determining 1993 eligibility were the same as 2000 and some were not (see 
Online Appendix Table A2). We define the superset of all the area characteristics relevant in 
1993 and 2000 as ,r tX . Therefore, the propensity of an area to be eligible in 2000 can be written 
as: 
(3)                                                     𝑆𝑟,00
∗ = 𝜃00𝑋𝑟,00 
The characteristics (𝑋𝑟,00) are area-specific but the policy parameters (𝜃00) are EU wide. 
Similarly, propensity to be eligible in 1993 is: 
(4)                                                        
93 ,93
*
,93 rrS X                                                               
Now consider the change in the propensity to be eligible:  
 
(5)  
00 ,00 93 ,93 00 93 ,93 ,00
* *
,93 93 00 93 ,00 ,93,00 ,93 ( ) ( ) ( )( )r r r r r rr rrS X X X X X XS X                 
                           
The change in eligibility will depend on the changes in the policy parameters 00 93( )  and 
changes in area characteristics, ,00 ,93( )r rX X . An obvious concern is that those areas that were 
declining may be more likely to become eligible for the policy and hence more likely to have 
worse outcomes. Consequently, we construct instrumental variables based solely on 
, 00 93 ,93z ( )r t rX    , the leading term in equation (5) instead of the actual change in eligibility 
which is a function of ,00 ,93( )r rX X . These are “synthetic instrumental variables” in the spirit 
of Gruber and Saez (2002) that should be purged of any suspected bias as they are constructed 
based solely on the rule changes and not changes in area characteristics.  
We present many tests of the validity of the IV strategy including running placebos on pre-
policy periods (see in particular subsection V.D). Our preferred estimation technique is to 
estimate equation (2) by IV in long-differences, but then condition on all the lagged levels of 
variables in the vector ,93rX  so that the IV treatment effect is identified purely from the 
interaction terms. An alternative, less parametric, approach to identification would be to 
implement a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (e.g. Dell, 2010) using the policy rule 
measures as running variables. We discuss our implementation of these RD approaches in 
13 
 
subsection V.D and Appendix F. They produce qualitatively similar results to our preferred IV 
approach, but with less precise estimates. Essentially, the RD approach is harder to implement in 
our context because of the high dimensionality of the policy rules and measurement error in the 
running variable.  
There are several practical issues in implementing this IV strategy (see Appendix B for more 
details). First, although the EU reveals what is in the X vector, it does not reveal the exact 
weights in  that determine eligibility. That is, we know whether a particular element of X has a 
weight of zero, but not the exact value of the non-zero weights. Nevertheless, we can empirically 
recover the weights by estimating a regression equivalent of equations (3) and (4) from our data. 
With the estimated ˆ   we can assign changes to maximum subsidy rates (NGEs) to areas based 
on 00 93 ,93
ˆ ˆ( ) rX   rather than any (potentially endogenous) changes in characteristics. Also, 
recall that ,93rX  is based on variables dated no later than 1991, so we are effectively using 
information from 1991 (and earlier) to construct instruments for the 1997-2004 period. The 
identification is from a non-linear interaction between these long pre-determined characteristics 
and the change in the policy parameters. Moreover, to allow for potential correlation between 
current variables and pre-1991 statistics we include ,93rX as additional set of controls. 
A second issue is that the maximum subsidy rate varies across the eligible areas (see Figure 
1). For example, pre-2000 there were Tier 1 areas with an NGE of 30% and Tier 2 areas with an 
NGE of 20%.  To deal with this, we estimate the policy parameters by performing ordered probit 
models
13
 separately for 1993 (three grouped outcomes) and 2000 (six grouped outcomes
14
). We 
use the ,93rX  observables for both ordered probits. From the 
ˆ
 we calculate the probability that 
an area will be in each subsidy regime in both pre and post 2000 periods. We then multiply these 
probabilities by the NGE in each regime to calculate an expected maximum subsidy level for an 
area based on pre-1993 characteristics and the policy parameters. This is the IV used which 
varies by area and across the policy change solely due to the policy parameters. Estimating by 
ordered probit also means that all probabilities are bounded between zero and one, which is not 
the case for OLS regression versions of (3) and (4). 
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 Nothing hinges on the particular distributional assumptions of the ordered probit. We have qualitatively similar 
results using ordered logits, OLS, etc. Appendix B discusses these alternatives. 
14
 The six maximum subsidy rates after 2000 are 0 for ineligible areas, 10%, 15%, 20% and 30% for “Tier 2” areas 
and 35% for “Tier 1” areas. Pre-2000 the rates were zero, 20% and 30%. 

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Continuing our simplified discussion from above, we implement equation (2) by 
differencing out the area fixed effect: 
(6)                                    , 1 , ,93 ,r t r t r t r ty NGE X t v                                                             
where , , ,97r t r t ry y y   , for t > 1997, as 1997 is the first year of our sample.
15
 We identify 
equation (6) by 2SLS using , 00 93 ,93z ( )r t rX     as an instrument for ,r tNGE . We also 
present OLS, reduced forms and first stages. The dependent variables are estimated in natural 
logarithms, so we add one to the small number of observations where the outcome value is 
zero.
16
 
Although the maximum investment subsidy rate (NGE) is an attractive treatment variable as 
it is the main EU-determined policy variable, an alternative specification to equation (6) is to use 
the subsidies actually paid out to firms in the area. The advantage of using the actual RSA 
subsidy is that it is more easily interpreted as “increasing the amount of dollar subsidies by 10% 
is associated with an increase in employment of y%”. The disadvantage of using the RSA 
subsidy is that we do not know the exact timing of when the subsidies are paid after the first year 
of receipt, so we have to define RSA subsidy as the amount of subsidy (in thousands of pounds 
sterling) that an area receives on average per year. For these reasons, we present results using 
both NGE eligibility and RSA subsidies as treatment indicators. 
The 2000 map of eligibility was based on Census wards. Our eligibility instrument is 
defined, therefore, at the ward level and in our baseline panel regressions our unit of analysis is 
at this level. As an extension, we also estimate our model at a higher level (TTWA) to 
investigate cross-area spillover effects and disaggregate to the plant/firm level to look at 
treatment heterogeneity. Similarly, in the baseline specification we cluster the standard errors at 
the ward level but show alternative treatments that allow for spatial autocorrelation (e.g. by 
clustering at the TTWA level or higher in subsection V.D). We discuss many additional 
econometric issues when we come to these results. 
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATING POLICY RULES 
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 As discussed in Appendix A, we start our base period in 1997 because (i) unemployment statistics are only 
available on a spatially consistent basis from this year and (ii) the electronic business register (IDBR) began in 1994 
and had some reliability issues issue in the first few years. We show robustness to starting in alternative years 
below. 
16
 For example, when we are looking at employment, L, as an outcome the dependent variable is y = ln(1+L). 100 of 
our 10,737 areas have zero manufacturing employment in all years (0.9% of the sample) and 21 areas have no 
unemployed in all years (0.2% of the sample). Our results are robust to dropping all areas with zeros in any year or 
all wards which had a zero in any year. We also obtain near identical results using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sign 
transformation where we use ln[L+√(1+L2)] as the dependent variable (see Card and Della Vigna, 2017).  
15 
 
IV.A Datasets 
Details on the data are in Appendix C, but we summarize the most important features here. We 
combine administrative data on program participants with official business performance data 
from the UK Census Bureau (Office of National Statistics, ONS). Specifically, we match the 
Selective Assistance Management Information System (SAMIS) database, the Interdepartmental 
Business Register (IDBR) and the Annual Respondents Database (ARD).
17
 The IDBR is the 
population business register containing every establishment’s employment, location and 
industry. We use this to construct jobs by area, our primary dependent variable, distinguishing 
between manufacturing jobs (where RSA is targeted) and non-manufacturing jobs. We match in 
unemployment from the local areas labor market statistics through the ONS Nomis service.  
SAMIS is the administrative database used to monitor RSA projects. It contains information 
on all program applications (almost 25,000) since the inception of RSA in 1972, and includes 
information on the name and address of the applicant, a project description, the amount applied 
for and the date of application. For successful applications, it provides the amount of subsidy and 
first date of payment.
18
 We match program participants with data from the population in the 
IDBR that includes addresses, industry, ownership and employment. The lowest level of data is 
at the business site level. The lowest level of aggregation we consider are all business sites of a 
particular firm in a ward that we refer to as a “plant”. This is because the unique business site 
identifier at the more disaggregated level is not always reliable.  
We matched 82% of all the RSA applicants between 1997 and 2004. The most common 
reason for non-matches is that the information on the SAMIS database is inadequately detailed to 
form a reliable match to the IDBR. To check for selection we conducted a detailed comparison 
of the characteristics of projects and project participants of matched with non-matched firms. All 
observable characteristics were balanced between the samples including application amounts, 
headquarter location, firm size and administrative location of agency analyzing the application 
(see Criscuolo et al., 2006). 
The ONS draws a stratified random sample of firms from the population of firms in the 
IDBR to form the ARD (Annual Respondents Database) from the Annual Business Inquiry 
(ABI) which is a mandatory survey. From the ARD we obtain information on investment, wages, 
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 The IDBR is the equivalent of the US Economic Census but has less data fields: it is a business register. The 
manufacturing part of the ARD is similar in structure to the US Annual Survey of Manufacturing. 
18
 Around 90% of applications were granted. There is information on applications not granted and we considered 
using these as part of our empirical design, but legal restrictions prevent us from matching these projects into the 
administrative data. 
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and productivity of firms. For multi-plant firms, the ARD reports this information only at the 
aggregate firm level rather than the plant level available in the IDBR. Overall, 80% of firms are 
single-plant and located at a single mailing address. The ARD does not consist of the complete 
population of all UK manufacturing firms, since the sample is stratified with smaller businesses 
sampled randomly. However, it does contain the population of larger businesses, which cover 
90% of total UK manufacturing employment.  
 
IV.B Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the number of wards broken down by the initial level of NGE 1993-1999 and the 
new post-policy change NGE after-2000. Before 2000 column (1) shows that 3,428 out of 
Britain’s 10,737 areas were eligible for some investment subsidy (2,012 areas had a maximum 
subsidy rate of 20% and 1,416 areas had a maximum rate of 30%). After the policy change, row 
(1) shows that 486 areas (summing columns (3) through (7)) which were previously ineligible 
for any subsidy became eligible and 1,106 areas which used to be eligible became ineligible 
(summing 841 and 265 in column (2)).  The total number of ineligible areas rose from 7,309 to 
7,929. There were also a large number of areas that were eligible in both periods, but still 
switched their level of NGE. For example, row (3) shows that of the areas which, pre-2000, were 
eligible for up to a 30% subsidy rate, 388 became eligible for up to a 35% subsidy, while 717 
saw their NGE fall to 20%, 30 to 15%, 16 to 10% and 265 to zero. Unsurprisingly, the majority 
of areas were ineligible for subsidies in all periods (6,823 areas out of a total of 10,737). 
 Aggregate expenditure on the program was about £164m per year over our sample 
period, and since 2001 has been generally declining over time. On average, 28% of all British 
wards are eligible for RSA accounting for 39% of manufacturing employment and 30% of 
manufacturing plants. Although, on average, only 3% of plants in eligible areas receive a new 
RSA grant in a given year, 18% of manufacturing employees have worked in a plant who 
received RSA at some point over our sample.  
We report some more descriptive statistics in Table 2. Areas eligible for subsidies (Panel 
B) have higher unemployment and more manufacturing workers than other areas. For example, 
in the 1997-1999 period the average ward has 267 manufacturing workers (Panel A) compared to 
351 in those areas eligible for RSA (Panel B). The average subsidy of a plant receiving a grant is 
just over £56,000 per year in the late 1990s and just under £36,000 in the 2000s (Panel B). In 
2000-2004, an average plant has 20 employees (Panel C), although plants in eligible areas tend 
to be larger (27 employees). Panel D compares firms in eligible areas who receive subsidies with 
17 
 
those who do not. Recipient firms are larger (87 vs. 31 workers), have 2.7% (= 0.042 - 0.015) 
lower TFP and 14% lower labor productivity (£38,600 vs. £44,900 value added per worker). As 
discussed in the Introduction, since the RSA program targets larger and less productive firms, 
naïve OLS analyses are likely to underestimate any potential positive effects.  
 
IV.C Estimating the Policy Rules 
The estimates used to construct the policy rule are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.
19
 
As discussed in Section III, these results are from ordered probit estimates of the area support 
levels (NGE). Note that three of the variables used as indicators in 2000 by policy-makers were 
not used in 1993 (the employment rate, the ILO unemployment rate and the share of 
manufacturing workers), so we drop these variables from the regressions in column (1), i.e. 
setting the coefficients on these variables to be zero. Similarly, there were two indicators that 
were used in 1993 but not in 2000 (the business start-up rate and the long-duration 
unemployment rate). Similarly, we set the coefficients on these variables to be zero in column 
(2).  
Looking across Table 3, the signs are generally intuitive. Areas with higher GDP per 
capita, higher population density, more skilled workers, higher business start-up rates, lower 
structural unemployment rates, higher activity rates and higher employment rates are all 
significantly less likely to be eligible for higher investment subsidies. The only surprises are that 
the claimant count unemployment rate (in 1993) and the ILO unemployment rate (in 2000) take 
counter-intuitive negative signs. This seems to be due to collinearity among the many 
unemployment measures. In 1993 (2000) there are four (five) labor market indicators that are all 
highly correlated. We illustrate the collinearity issue by estimating similar regressions with fewer 
unemployment variables. For 1993, when we drop structural unemployment, the results in 
column (3) show that the coefficient on the current unemployment rate takes its expected 
positive sign. For the period from 2000 onwards, column (4) shows that the coefficient on ILO 
unemployment reduces in absolute size and is no longer significant when we drop the claimant 
count and structural unemployment rate.
20
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 Online Appendix Table A2 has definitions and descriptive statistics. 
20
 We checked that these collinearity issues are not spuriously driving our key findings. We constructed the rule 
change instruments dropping some of the potentially collinear variables and found that our results are robust. For 
example, using the estimates from the last two columns of Table 3 (instead of our baseline estimates using the first 
two columns) generated a coefficient (standard error) on the IV estimates in the employment equation of 
0.653(0.322) compared to 0.953(0.260) in the baseline estimates of column (4) in Table 4, Panel A.  
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As discussed in Section III we use the results from columns (1) and (2) to construct our 
IV for the policy: the change in the predicted level of maximum investment subsidy based on 
pre-1993 area characteristics. The distribution of the level of the IV (
, ,93zr t rX ) is shown in 
Panel A of Online Appendix Figure A1, and the change (which we use as our IV, 
, 00 93 ,93z ( )r t rX    ) is in Panel B. There is a mass point close to zero in both levels and 
changes as most areas have a very low probability of being treated and this does not change over 
time (as in the actual data). However, the IV has positive mass over the entire support of the 
NGE distribution both in levels and in changes. Panel B shows an asymmetry with more areas 
predicted to lose eligibility than gain it, consistent with the actual changes in eligibility for 
investment subsidies reported in Table 1. 
 
V. AREA LEVEL ANALYSIS  
V.A Main Results 
We turn first to the area level results, focusing mainly on those at the ward level. Recall that our 
identification strategy uses exogenous policy rule changes that determine which wards are 
“randomized in” to be eligible (or ineligible) for support.  
Figure 3 shows changes in employment for areas whose support levels were predicted to 
increase because of the policy rule change in 2000 – i.e. a discrete version of our instrumental 
variable - compared to areas where support levels were predicted to decrease.
21
 Since this is for 
manufacturing, a sector in long-run decline, both lines are on a downward trend, but there is no 
sign of significant differential trends prior to the 2000 policy change. The figure clearly suggests 
that manufacturing employment fell significantly less in areas where predicted eligibility for 
investment subsidies increased after 2000 compared to those areas where predicted eligibility 
fell. 
Figure 4 reports the same results for unemployment. The 1997-2004 period was one of 
strong growth in the UK economy and unemployment was falling across the country. It is clear 
that there is a significantly faster fall in unemployment in the areas which where exogenously 
more likely to become eligible for investment subsidies after 2000 (dashed line).  By 2004, these 
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 Recall that our instrument is derived from the change (due to rule changes) in predicted support levels. There are 
no areas where predicted support levels stay precisely constant because the probabilities are continuous. 
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areas enjoyed falls in unemployment about 7% higher than elsewhere. By contrast, prior to 2000 
the falls in unemployment were statistically identical across the two groups of areas.
22
  
Table 4 reports first area-level regression results. Panel A contains results for 
manufacturing employment. In column (1), we report regressions using the change in the area’s 
maximum investment subsidy rate (NGE) as the main explanatory variable. There is a positive 
correlation with employment, but it is only significant at the 10 percent level and is small in 
magnitude: increasing the available investment subsidy by 10 percentage points is associated 
with a 1.2% increase in employment. Column (2) presents the reduced form using our policy rule 
instrumental variable constructed from exogenous changes in subsidy eligibility using the change 
in EU wide policy parameters. The coefficient on the IV is positive and significant as suggested 
by Figure 3. Column (3) reports the first stage regression with NGE changes as the outcome and 
shows that this is strongly predicted by our IV. The final column reports the IV results 
suggesting that the causal effect of RSA is over seven times as large as the OLS estimate of 
column (1). A 10 percentage point increase in the maximum investment subsidy (e.g. an increase 
in NGE from 0 to 0.1) leads to a 10% (= exp(0.0953x0.1) – 1)x100) increase in jobs. This OLS 
bias is consistent with what we would expect: a positive shock to an area decreases the 
probability of it becoming eligible for investment subsidies, so OLS underestimates the 
employment increasing effects of the policy.
23
 
As noted above, RSA is focused on the manufacturing sector. Consequently, the increase 
in manufacturing employment in Panel A of Table 4 could come from decreases in jobs in non-
manufacturing sectors. To assess this, we do two things. First, in Panel B we estimate identical 
specifications to Panel A, but instead use ln(unemployment) as a dependent variable to see if 
joblessness falls in eligible areas. Second, in Panel C we directly examine non-manufacturing 
employment. Panel B shows that unemployment falls significantly in areas that become eligible 
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 We also reproduced Figures 3 and 4 using the actual changes in areas eligible for RSA rather than the predicted 
changes. Consistent with our concern over endogeneity there is evidence of pre-trends in the expected direction 
using the actual changes. For example, areas that were ineligible for RSA, but became eligible after 2000 had larger 
average falls in employment than areas which did not change their eligibility status (or lost it). 
23
 All results are robust to using the level instead of the logarithm of the dependent variable. For example, in levels 
the coefficient on NGE in the IV employment equation of column (4) of Panel A is 644.6 with a standard error of 
112.9. This implies a ten percentage point increase in NGE increases the number of manufacturing jobs in a ward by 
64 or 18% at the mean level of employment (351 in Panel B of Table 2). This larger effect is driven by outliers 
which are dampened by the log transformation. For example, if we winsorize the upper and lower 5% of the 
employment distribution and re-estimate in levels the coefficient on NGE becomes 303.9 with a standard error of 
34.4, which for a 10 percentage point NGE increase implies a 9% rise in employment, much closer to our baseline 
results. Similarly, other transformations such as using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sign gave similar results. For 
example, the IV coefficient (standard error) was 0.968 (0.286) in a specification like column (4) of Panel A  
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for higher levels of investment subsidy. Just like manufacturing employment, the beneficial 
effects of the policy on unemployment is underestimated by the OLS estimates in column (1) 
compared to the IV estimates. A 10 percentage point increase in NGE causes a 4.2% fall in 
unemployment in column (4). By contrast, there appears to be no significant effect of NGE on 
non-manufacturing employment in Panel C. For example, the coefficient in column (4) is 0.177 
with a standard error of 0.161 (compared to 0.953 for manufacturing). Consequently, NGE 
increases the share of manufacturing jobs as well as the total number of jobs in an area.
24
 
Table 5 reports the same set of regressions as Table 4 but uses the amount of subsidy that 
an area receives on average per year as the main right hand side variable (rather than grant 
eligibility). Hence, we can interpret the estimated coefficient as the elasticity of the labor market 
outcome with respect to subsidy payments. We obtain qualitatively similar results to Table 4. For 
example, the final column suggests that a 10% increase in subsidy spending leads to a 2.9% 
increase in manufacturing jobs and a 1.3% fall in area unemployment and no effect on non-
manufacturing jobs.
25
  
V.B Other Policies 
An important concern with our findings so far is whether there are other policies 
correlated with changes in RSA that could confound our results. For such a policy to bias the IV 
results, the omitted policy change would not only have to be effective in affecting jobs, but also 
be correlated with our rule change instrument (the interaction of the RSA policy parameters and 
the lagged area characteristics). To consider this issue we undertook a detailed investigation of 
all area-based policies we could find that changed in our sample period as documented in 
Appendix E. From this, we conclude that the only policy that causes material concerns are the 
EU “Structural Funds” (SF), which support infrastructure projects in roads and energy as well as 
initiatives for economic and social regeneration of urban areas.
26
 As with RSA, the map of EU 
supported areas focused on disadvantaged areas and also changed in 2000. Fortunately, the areas 
that saw a change in their eligibility for Structural Funds are not all the same as those that saw a 
change in their eligibility for RSA. In fact, there is considerable variation in the areas that 
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 Using the share of manufacturing jobs as the dependent variable and estimating column (4) leads to a coefficient 
(standard error) of 0.137(0.033) on NGE. Using the ln(total number of jobs) has a coefficient (standard error) of 
0.353(0.144) on NGE in this IV specification. 
25
 Since some of the subsidies (and their effects) could persist for longer periods of time after an area becomes 
eligible we may be underestimating the longer-term effect as our dataset ends in 2004. 
26
 The structural funds are the financial tools the EU uses to implement regional policy (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/). Past evaluations report mixed results for the effect of structural 
funds. Recently Becker et al. (2010, 2012a,b) have a more positive assessment especially for regions with higher 
absorptive capacity (those that are richer and hence closer to the cut-off point for EU funding). 
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switched in and out of RSA and Structural Funds eligibility (see Online Appendix Table A3). 
Total SF spending is higher than RSA, although the direct SF grants to business are an order of 
magnitude smaller than RSA. For example in 1997 the total amount of RSA grants accepted was 
£158.3 million while the total amount of Structural Regional Development Funds was £621 
million (House of Commons, 2000), only £15.6 million of this amount was paid as business 
grants (1997 Annual Report of the Industrial Development Act).  
 As with RSA, changes in Structural Fund eligibility are unlikely to be exogenous to local 
shocks as the Structural Funds are designed to provide support for declining areas. Consequently, 
we implement the same methodology used for RSA to develop an IV for Structural Funds based 
on the criteria that the EU used in determining whether an area is eligible for Structural Fund 
support. Despite considerable overlap with the variables used to determine RSA eligibility there 
are sufficient differences in the EU criteria to make this strategy viable. For example, local crime 
rates were a criterion for Structural Funds (but not RSA), and the start-up rate and activity rates 
were criteria for RSA (but not Structural Funds). We exploit these differences when estimating 
the Structural Fund policy rules.
27
 From the estimated weights on the Structural Funds criteria 
and lagged characteristics we construct a policy rule change IV for EU Structural Funds and re-
estimate our main specifications augmented to include these new variables.  
Results accounting for SF are reported in Table 6 and should be compared to those 
reported in Table 4. Although our instruments are powerful in predicting eligibility for Structural 
Funds (see column (4)), the results are somewhat mixed on the policy itself. The coefficients 
generally suggest beneficial labor market effects of Structural Funds (except for the employment 
IV in column (5) of Panel A), but are significant only for unemployment (in the OLS and 
reduced form of columns (1) and (2)). More importantly, there remains a positive and significant 
effect of investment subsidies (NGE) in the IV regressions of column (5) and the reduced forms 
of column (2) for employment (and significant beneficial effects on unemployment) even after 
conditioning on Structural Funds. In our preferred IV specifications the coefficient on NGE rises 
from 0.953 to 0.999 for employment and changes from -0.414 to -0.409 for unemployment. 
Hence, although there is some evidence that Structural Funds may have some benefits, 
accounting for this policy does nothing to materially change our conclusions on the positive 
effects of the RSA program. 
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 See Online Appendix Table A4 (the analog to Table 3).  
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As noted above, we also considered a wide range of other place-based policies. We 
identified six other place-based policies that changed in our sample period: Employment Zones, 
Coalfields Regeneration Scheme, Regional Venture Capital Funds, Enterprise Grants, the New 
Deal for Communities and Devolution to Scotland and Wales. The details of each of these are 
discussed more in Appendix E. These policies do not have an explicit set of EU rules that we can 
use to construct the same instruments as RSA and Structural Funds. Therefore, to control for the 
effect of these policies we simply include a dummy variable which switches on when an area 
becomes eligible for the policy. Table 7 displays the results for employment reduced forms 
(Panel A) and IV regressions (Panel B) with specifications based on those of columns (2) and (4) 
of Table 4 Panel A.
28
 We include each policy variable one by one in columns (1) through (6), 
and then all together in column (7). As is clear from the table, the effect of RSA is robust to the 
inclusion of all these other policy controls, remaining statistically significant with a very similar 
coefficient throughout (the coefficient in the reduced form is now 0.815 compared to 0.839 in the 
baseline Table 4 results and for IV is now 0.966 compared to 0.953 in the baseline). As for the 
other policies, some appear to have perverse negative and significant coefficients on jobs (e.g. 
New Deal for Communities and Devolution to Scotland and Wales) whereas others have 
generally positive coefficients (e.g. Regional Venture Capital Fund). Given that we do not have 
instruments for these policies, we should not read too much into the coefficients. Finally, column 
(8) also adds in Structural Funds to the specification of column (7), treated endogenously as in 
Table 6). The SF coefficient is significant in the reduced form of Panel A, but insignificant for 
the IV specification of Panel B.
29
 More importantly for us, the RSA treatment effect remains 
significant.  
The main message from both Tables 6 and 7 is that our estimates of the effects of RSA 
appear robust to a variety of ways of controlling for potentially confounding policies. 
 
V.C Higher levels of aggregation (TTWA) 
In this subsection we compare the policy effects at the ward level to the more aggregate “Travel 
to Work Area” (TTWA) level in order to examine spillover effects across areas.30 When an area 
becomes eligible for investment subsidies firms may relocate jobs from neighboring ineligible 
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 Equivalent results for unemployment are contained in Online Appendix Table A5.  
29
 The Structural Funds coefficient is significant for both specifications in Online Appendix Table A5 when we use 
unemployment as the dependent variable. 
30
 A TTWA is similar to a US Commuting Zone. There is variation within a TTWA in ward eligibility. Post-2000, in 
a TTWA with at least one eligible ward only 31.5% of wards had positive NGE. Pre-2000 the number was 35%. 
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areas. For example, consider a ward, r  and its neighbor r’, in a single TTWA (the example is 
easily generalized to r = 1, 2,... , R contiguous wards). The ward employment regression (in long 
differences) can take the form: 
Δ𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜆1Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 − 𝜒Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟′,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑟,𝑡 
 
Where the “spillover” coefficient   reflects the fact that a neighboring area that becomes 
eligible for RSA may cause employment to relocate away from ward r.  Below we estimate 
higher-level TTWA (subscript a) equations of the form: 
(7)                                                   Δ𝑦𝑎,𝑡 = 𝜇Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑎,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑎,𝑡                                                        
Where  𝑦𝑎,𝑡 is the log of TTWA employment and ,a tNGE  is the average NGE change in the two 
wards weighted by the lagged ward-level employment levels; i.e. Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑎,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑟Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 + (1 −
𝑤𝑟)Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟′,𝑡  where 𝑤𝑟 =
𝐿𝑟,0
𝐿𝑟,0+𝐿𝑟′,0
  is the share of employment in region r in the base year 0.31 
In Appendix D we show that if there are no spillovers (i.e. 𝜒 = 0) we would expect to see that 
𝜇 ≈ 𝜆1.  If there are negative spillovers we would expect 𝜇 < 𝜆1.  In the extreme case where the 
program simply causes shifting between areas (as Wilson, 2009, suggests for R&D tax credits 
across American states) the coefficient of NGE in equation (7) will be zero ( =0). 
We replicate the results from Panels A and B of Table 4 at the TTWA level in Table 8. The 
qualitative results are similar and there is no evidence of the earlier results over-estimating the 
treatment effects. For example, the policy effect is 1.006 in the employment IV regressions in 
Panel A compared to 0.953 in the baseline results (and -0.806 for unemployment vs. -0.414 in 
the baseline). This is inconsistent with large negative spillover effects on neighboring areas. The 
unemployment results suggest that revitalizing one area may actually strengthen neighbors, 
although given the size of the standard errors, we should be cautious about concluding there are 
positive spillovers.
32
 
 
V.D Other Area level Robustness Tests  
We conducted a large number of other robustness tests, some of which we sketch here with 
details in Appendix F. First, our baseline regression results in Table 4 control for the levels of all 
variables in Table 3 that enter the policy rules (the ,93rX ). We checked the robustness of the 
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 The weights are based on 1996 employment levels to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
32
 We are assuming that displacement is most likely to occur across neighboring areas. It is possible that 
displacement occurs from other areas of the UK, but it is likely that local displacement would be strongest. 
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results to using higher order polynomial functions of the ,93rX  (quadratic and interaction terms), 
dropping them completely or adding in the predicted probabilities from the ordered probits (see 
Online Appendix Table A6). The results were robust to these experiments.  
Second, although Figures 3 and 4 do not suggest any spurious differential pre-2000 trends 
we also ran placebo tests where we introduced “pseudo policies” of the same form as RSA in the 
pre-2000 period. These were always insignificant. For example, we estimated the employment 
reduced form on the 1995-2000 data but used the post-2000 policy instruments as if they were 
introduced in 1997 (see Online Appendix Table A7). The reduced form has a coefficient 
(standard error) of 0.162(0.163) compared to 0.839(0.228) in the main specification in column 
(2) of Table 4 Panel A.
33
  
Third, we were concerned that we may have under-estimated the standard errors by 
clustering just at the ward level as there may be more spatial autocorrelation across areas as 
suggested by the fact that contiguous wards tend to have similar levels of NGE. Online 
Appendix F.1 discusses this in more detail, but in short we addressed this issue by clustering the 
standard errors at higher geographical levels such as (i) the TTWA (322 clusters); (ii) alternative 
clusters based on areas that had the same levels of NGE and shared, contiguous borders (102 
clusters) or (iii) clusters based on areas that had the same levels of NGE and borders within 1km 
(80 clusters) and (iv) the NUTS2 regional level (34 clusters). Regardless of the approach, the 
coefficient on NGE remained significant in the employment regressions at the 5% level or 
greater in all specifications. The same was true when we used unemployment as the dependent 
variable with the sole exception of using the most conservative approach of clustering by the 34 
NUTS2 areas.
34
 
Fourth, we considered Regression Discontinuity designs (see Online Appendix F.2-F.4). In 
principle, since we know the variables underlying the rules, conditioning on polynomials of the 
rules should remove the correlation of NGE with unobservable influences on our outcomes. 
Implementing this design is empirically challenging in our context as we do not directly observe 
the running variable, the threshold is unknown and the variables underlying the policy rules are 
high dimensional (e.g. 8 indicators pre-2000 and 9 thereafter) and are likely measured with error. 
                                                 
33
 We use 1997 as the base year rather than 1995 as the unemployment series has a break in 1996. If we use 1995 as 
the base year for the employment regressions, our results are very similar. For example the coefficient (standard 
error) on NGE in the IV regression is 1.295(0.325). 
34
 Another issue is that since the instruments are generated regressors (from Table 3), formally we should allow for 
this in the calculation of the variance-covariance matrix. Doing so, however, made very little difference to the 
results as shown, for example, in Online Appendix Table A8. 
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However, for one indicator, GDP per capita, we do know the cut-off for eligibility (75% of the 
EU average GDP per capita in the NUT2 region). We implement a RD Design using this 
threshold and find a significant effect of the cut-off on NGE as well as treatment effects that are 
larger than our main estimates, although very imprecisely estimated (see Online Appendix Table 
A9). For example, a ten percentage point increase in NGE causes an (insignificant) 19% increase 
in employment compared to 10% in our baseline.
35
  
Finally, we conducted a large number of other robustness tests such as using a longer time 
period (from 1986 onwards instead of 1997; examining general equilibrium effects on factor 
prices -wages- and using matching estimators. Our results are robust to these tests.
36
 
 
VI. MICRO-ANALYSIS AT FIRM AND PLANT LEVEL AND OVERALL 
MAGNITUDES 
Having established that there appears to be a causal effect of increasing jobs (and reducing 
unemployment) in those areas that became eligible for higher rates of RSA subsidy, we now turn 
to the micro-economic impact of RSA at the plant and firm level. 
 
VI.A Extensive vs. Intensive Margins: Number of Plants as an outcome 
The area level employment effects could come from incumbents expanding (the intensive 
margin), higher net entry (the extensive margin of less exit or more entry) or a mixture of both. 
To address this we re-estimate the main specifications, but use the ln(number of manufacturing 
plants) as the dependent variable. Panel A of Table 9 reports the baseline results for the 
specifications of Table 4 where the treatment variable is NGE, Panel B has those for Table 5 
(RSA subsidy amounts), Panel C has Table 6 (NGE and inclusion of Structural Funds) and Panel 
D has the analog of Table 8 (NGE at higher Travel to Work Areas). The policy does appear to 
have positive effects on the extensive margin, although the IV coefficients are insignificant in all 
panels except Panel A. We conclude from this table that the primary effect of the policy must be 
on the intensive margin, increasing jobs in incumbent firms, which we now turn to analyze 
explicitly. 
                                                 
35
 Another reason for the higher point estimates is the 75% of per capita GDP is also the threshold for receipt of 
Objective One structural Funds. Online Appendix F discusses various other RD Designs. For example, we also 
considered an alternative approach involving conditioning on polynomials of all the rules pre and post 2000. These 
produce significant and correctly signed coefficients on the policy variables that are larger in magnitude than the 
OLS estimates, but smaller than our preferred IV results (see Online Appendix Table A10).  
36
 Details in in Online Appendix Table A11 and Online Appendix F5. 
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VI.B Heterogeneous policy effects by firm size 
 Table 10 presents ln(employment) regressions where the treatment variable continues to 
be the maximum investment subsidy available in the area where a plant is located (NGE). The IV 
results of column (4) of Panel A implies that an increase of NGE by 10 percentage points leads 
to a 4.7% increase in plant level employment. We also find a large difference between the OLS 
and IV coefficients that is consistent with strong selection effects at the plant level. 
The discussion in Section II implied that the treatment effects could be more pronounced for 
smaller firms, so we examine size as one observable source of heterogeneous treatment effects. 
We use lagged firm employment as a measure of size when splitting the plant sample as credit 
constraints or the gaming of the system depends on the size of the firm, not the plant per se (e.g. 
a ten-worker factory owned by General Electric still benefits from GE’s deep financial pockets). 
In addition, to mitigate endogeneity biases we measure size using the firm’s employment level in 
1996 - the year before the start of our estimation period (for firms born after 1996 we use size in 
the first year and drop this observation from the regressions).  
  We report plant level employment regressions separately for small firms (firm 
employment under 50) and large firms (over 50 employees) in Panels B and C respectively in 
Table 10. The first stages are strong for both types of firms with a near identical coefficient (0.68 
vs. 0.64). However, the IV effect is positive and significant for plants in small firms but 
insignificant and around a sixth of the size for plants in big firms.
37
 Similarly, there is a large and 
significant reduced form effect in column (2) for small firms but a small and insignificant effect 
for large firms.
38
  This implies that plants that are part of small firms drove the aggregate area 
effect identified in the previous section.  
There could be at least two different reasons for the heterogeneity of the policy effect by 
firm size. Firstly, although large firms are often based in areas that receive support – hence the 
highly significant first stage in column (3) – the size of their grants could be relatively less 
generous. An alternative story is that they are equally well supported, but the subsidies generate 
less jobs. We explored this by examining regressions of employment on actual RSA support.
39
  
Regardless of whether we use a dummy or a continuous treatment indicator there is a large and 
significant positive effect of receiving investment subsidies when estimated by IV for small 
                                                 
37
 In Online Appendix Table A12 we vary the exact definition of a “small” firm and show our results are robust to 
varying the exact size threshold. 
38
 The effects are also significantly different at the 5% level for large firms vs. small firms (see Online Appendix 
Table A13 column (1)). 
39
 Online Appendix Table A14 is the analog of Table 5. 
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firms, but not for large firms. Hence, these results reject the hypothesis that the absence of a 
large firm effect is because they simply obtain less subsidies, but it is rather that small firms 
create more jobs from the subsidies they receive compared to big firms.
40
  
What could explain the different treatment effects between small and large firms? One 
possibility is that small firms might be (more) financially constrained than larger ones. With 
asymmetric information between borrower and lender, young firms will be at a disadvantage 
because credit markets will have less time to observe their performance. Recent evidence, 
however, stresses that although there is a correlation between youth and size, many small firms 
are not young (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). A simple test of the credit constraint hypothesis is to 
interact the treatment effects with firm age since younger firms are more likely to be subject to 
credit constraints. We ran IV employment regressions where we include interactions between 
NGE support level with both indicators capturing (i) whether the firm is small and (ii) whether 
the firm is young (using different definitions for young).
41
 We instrument these treatment 
variables by including the equivalent interactions between the rule change instrument and the 
respective indicators. The interaction between the support level (NGE) and (small) size is always 
significant and positive whereas the interaction between NGE and being young is insignificant 
(and actually negative) and this finding is robust to the exact measure of being young.  Since 
young firms respond less to the policy, the bigger program effect for small firms does not seem 
consistent with a simple financial constraints story. 
An alternative explanation of these results is that large firms might have more scope to 
“game” the system; i.e. receive the subsidy without actually being constrained by the 
requirements of the program to create jobs. For instance, they might have more scope to pretend 
to create jobs while actually reducing employment in another location of the business.
42
 
Although we do not have direct evidence of this, this explanation is consistent with the pattern of 
results described above. 
                                                 
40
 An objection is that the relevant quantity is not the elasticity of employment with respect to a subsidies for large 
vs. small firms, but rather the marginal effect on the absolute number of jobs created with respect to a $1 increase in 
subsidy.  Online Appendix Table A15 conducts this analysis and shows that a $1 of subsidy to a small firm still 
creates over eight times as many jobs as $1 of subsidy to a large firm according to our estimates.  
41
 See Online Appendix Table A13. 
42
 Recall from Section II that absent the requirement to create or safeguard jobs the RSA is effectively a subsidy to 
capital and might reduce the firm’s choice of employment depending on the elasticity of substitution between labor 
and capital. 
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VI.C Firm level Results: Employment, Capital and Productivity  
We report regressions at the firm level in Table 11, motivated by two considerations. First, it 
could be the case that the nationwide effect is zero if multi-plant firms are simply switching jobs 
within the firm across eligible and ineligible areas. Secondly, there are richer data at the firm 
level from official production surveys (the ARD) including output, capital and materials for a 
stratified random subsample of firms.  
In the UK, data on investment, output and materials are reported at the firm level rather than 
the plant-level.
43
 For most firms the firm and plant-level coincide - on average 80% of our 
observations are single plant firms. Employment, our main outcome of interest, is always 
available at the plant level in the IDBR data and we know the location of all plants within multi-
plant firms. To examine firm-level outcomes (such as investment) which are unavailable at the 
plant level, we simply aggregate NGE across all plants using lagged plant employment shares 
within the firm as weights.  
Panel A of Table 11 reports employment regressions at the firm level using the IDBR 
population. These are very similar to the plant level results, suggesting that within firm re-
allocation across plants in response to the policy is not a major issue. In the other panels we use 
the ARD data  that has information on other outcomes such as investment. In Panel B we report 
results for employment estimated using the ARD sub-sample and confirm our earlier finding of a 
positive causal impact on jobs. In Panel C we find larger impacts on capital investment than we 
did for employment consistent with the simple theory model in Section II. Panel D shows that 
there is also an impact on output. Finally, Panel E uses a Solow residual based TFP measure (for 
more details on the calculation see Online Appendix C) and finds no significant effect of the 
policy. We looked at a variety of other methods of calculating TFP, but in no case do we find a 
significant impact on productivity (see Online Appendix Table A16). There were also no 
significant program effects on wages.
44
  
Motivated by the theory in Section II – suggesting that more capital-intensive firms are more 
responsive to the policy - we interacted the treatment effects with a dummy for whether the firm 
had a high level of capital costs in revenues prior to the 2000 policy change. Consistent with the 
model, firms where the capital share was high (big Ks ) had stronger positive employment effects. 
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  We call this the firm level, j, but there could be many reporting units in one large firm.  
44
 For example, when we replaced the dependent variable by wages in the reduced form of column (2) the 
coefficient on the policy rule IV was 0.287 with a standard error of 0.877. This is consistent with the absence of an 
area level wage effect of NGE (see Appendix F.5). 
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The interaction of the rule change IV and a dummy for high capital share firms had a coefficient 
(standard error) of 0.525(0.200) in the employment reduced form.
45
 
 
VI.D Magnitudes 
To consider the overall magnitude of the impact of RSA we consider what would have happened 
if, instead of re-drawing the map in 2000, the program had simply been abolished. Appendix G 
gives details of the calculations. We start with the IV coefficient from column (4) of Table 4 
Panel A of 0.953 (indicating that a 10 percentage point NGE investment subsidy would increase 
area-level manufacturing employment by 10%) and consider the area by area change in NGE (to 
zero) given employment levels. This calculation suggests a loss of just under 156,000 jobs. The 
nominal average annual cost of RSA was about £164m. Using official estimates of 
administrative costs (17% of the aggregate grant value)
46
 and a deadweight cost of taxation of 
50%, this implies a total annual cost of £288m. This leads to a “cost per job” of £1,846 
(=288/0.156), or $3,541 (at 2010 prices). If we took the more conservative OLS estimates from 
column (1) which has a treatment effect of 0.124, we get smaller job effects of just under 22,400 
and the cost per job would be £12,857 (or $24,662). Since there do not appear to be large 
substitution effects from neighboring non-eligible areas, these do not need to be scaled down.  
In Appendix G we provide figures for the limited number of studies that report cost per job 
for similar policies to those we examine here. Two methodological differences help partly 
explain our lower cost per job numbers. First, three area-based studies (Busso and Kline, 2008; 
Busso et al., 2010 and Freedman, 2012) do not use IV.
47
 As noted already, we find much larger 
effects correcting for endogeneity using IV. Second, the three other studies only have estimates 
at the firm level. When we take into account that we find zero effects of RSA on large firms, we 
obtain a cost per job of $26,572, higher than the US figure in Brown and Earle (2017), but lower 
than the two Italian studies (Pellegrini and Muccigrosso, 2017, and Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014). 
In addition to these methodological differences, the RSA program is different from the other 
studies in that it subsidises capital and not labor, and the government agency selects firms who 
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 See Online Appendix Table A17 (a generalization of column (2) in Table 11 Panel B).   
46
 We use the administrative reports of the grants awarded averaging £164m and add to this the estimations from the 
National Audit Office (2003) that there were 10% spent in government administration costs for RSA, and an average 
7% cost to firms in application and management costs. Note that our implied jobs effects are much larger than those 
found in the existing evaluations of the RSA policy surveyed National Audit Office (2003) and Wren (2005). We 
believe this is because no other study has exploited the exogenous changes in RSA eligibility to deal with the 
downward endogeneity bias. 
47
 Cost per job figures for Busso and Kline (2008) are reported in Bartik (2010) and for Busso et al. (2010) in 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008). 
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can show evidence of job additionality rather than providing subsidies for all eligible firms that 
locate in supported areas.  
The cost per job is, of course, far from a welfare calculation, as we are not factoring in other 
distortions such as the dampening effect on aggregate productivity of keeping open less 
productive firms and the usual static deadweight losses from capital subsidies. On the other 
hand, there are likely to be first-order benefits from the fact that RSA significantly reduces 
unemployment by reducing job losses in the manufacturing sector. So overall, these calculations 
suggest a more positive assessment of this selective place-based industrial policy than the 
existing literature. 
 
VI.E “Big Push”: Asymmetries of subsidy removal?  
Recent work on place-based policies have emphasized that their long-run success depends 
on whether there are big dynamic effects (e.g. Kline and Moretti, 2014a). Is continued support 
needed in order to achieve lasting gains in employment or can a “big push” move an area into a 
new equilibrium were employment gains continue even after the subsidy has been removed? We 
can find no evidence for the big push hypothesis in our data for manufacturing employment or 
unemployment. For example, in one experiment, we defined a series of dummy variable for the 
NGE amount and length of time that an area had received RSA support and interacted these with 
our treatment effects, but there was no significant heterogeneity in this dimension.
48
  
We also tried differentiating between areas that experienced an increase compared to a 
decrease in investment subsidies in 2000. The big push story suggests that areas losing subsidies 
should have less of a negative jobs effect than the positive effect of places gaining subsidies. We 
found that areas which lost subsidies had just as much of a negative effect (if not more) than 
areas which became eligible for subsidies.
49
 
The absence of dynamic effects could be because the RSA policy is much less intense than 
the Tennessee Value Authority studied by Kline and Moretti (2014b) - it does not include 
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 For example, we created a dummy variable equal to one if an area received the maximum investment subsidy rate 
(NGE=30%) continuously between 1986 and 1999 (and zero otherwise) and interacted this with support level 
treatment. When included in the employment regression of column (4) of Table 4 (alongside the linear dummy), this 
interaction variable had an insignificant coefficient (standard error) of 0.121 (0.390). As an instrument for the 
interaction we use the interaction between rule change instrument and the 30% NGE indicator.  
49
 For example, we ran our standard IV regressions of the form: 𝛥 ln 𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛽1 [𝐼{𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 0} × 𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡] +
𝛽2[(1 − 𝐼{𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 0}) × 𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡] + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑡 where, 𝐼{𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 0} is an indicator variable equal to one if 
NGE falls in value. We instrumented these with the usual rule change instrument interacted with whether it 
increased or decreased. For both employment and unemployment as an outcome, areas which lost subsidies had 
significantly lower jobs (and higher unemployment). These coefficients where not significantly smaller than for the 
areas which gained subsidies. 
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infrastructure, for example. Nevertheless, our evidence does not seem supportive of the view that 
support of regions through this type of policies is likely to be transformational. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
There are surprisingly few micro-econometric analyses of the causal effects of industrial 
policies, despite their ubiquity across the world. In this paper, we have examined one business 
support policy – Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). We use exogenous changes in the 
eligibility of areas to receive investment subsidies driven by EU rule changes determining which 
areas were eligible for investment subsidies. When we correct for endogeneity we find evidence 
for a positive treatment effect on jobs in the eligible areas and on employment. We also find that 
the program effects are strong for smaller firms but effectively zero for larger firms. This is 
consistent with large firms being able to “game” the system and/or financial constraints being 
unimportant for these firms (although we do not find much evidence for this latter hypothesis). 
Interestingly, this stronger effect of business support policies on smaller firms is found in many 
other studies.
50
 The fact that the treatment effect is confined to smaller firms strengthens 
arguments for restricting subsidies that go to larger enterprises, although one must be careful that 
this does not create strong disincentives for firms to grow (as they may forfeit such size related 
subsidies – see Garicano et al. 2016).  
At the area level we also find that the program reduced unemployment and raised 
manufacturing employment mainly in the intensive margin (rather than the number of firms – the 
extensive margin). The positive effects on participants’ employment was not due to equal and 
offsetting falls in employment in non-participants, non-eligible neighboring areas or sectors who 
were not covered by the scheme. Finally, we find no effects on (total factor) productivity. From a 
policy perspective, the fact that the subsidies were effective in raising employment and 
investment in these deprived areas at a modest “cost per job” should be regarded as a positive 
outcome.  Although measured aggregate productivity falls as the RSA supported firms were on 
average less productive (creating a distortion through misallocation, as in Hsieh and Klenow, 
2009, for example), this probably carries a modest welfare cost compared to the counterfactual 
where these employees enter unemployment (rather than being reallocated to firms that are more 
productive). Given the severe economic stress affecting some local communities with formerly 
                                                 
50
 For example, Howell (2017), Zwick and Mahon (2017) and Wallsten (2000) for the US, Gorg and Strobl (2007) 
for Ireland, Lach (2002) for Israel, Bronzini and Iachini (2014) for Italy, González et al. (2005) for Spain and 
Dechezlepretre et al. (2018) for the UK. 
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large manufacturing sectors (and the political implications of this), understanding the impact of 
the type of policy we have examined here is, in our view, very important. 
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Figure 1:  The Change in the level of maximum investment subsidy (NGE) between 1993 (left hand side) and 2000 (right hand side)  
  
Notes: The shaded areas are those that are eligible for some Regional Selective Assistance. In the 1993-1999 period, the dark shaded areas are the very deprived areas eligible 
for an investment subsidy of up to 30% NGE (the maximum investment subsidy, Net Grant Equivalent). The light shaded areas are eligible for up to 20% NGE. After 2000 
Tier 1 areas had 35% NGE and Tier 2 areas ranged between 10% and 30%. 
Source: Department of Business, Innovation and Skills “Industrial Development Reports”, various years. 
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Figure 2: Effects of the RSA policy on capital 
Panel A – Perfect Capital Markets 
 
Panel B – Imperfect Capital Markets 
 
 
Notes: These figures examine the theoretical effect of the RSA policy reducing the cost of capital with perfect 
capital markets (Panel A) and imperfect capital markets (Panel B). For affected firms this is likely to raise 
capital, but the extent to which it does so will depend on a variety of factors such as whether a firm is financially 
constrained or more closely monitored (see text). 
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Figure 3: Changes in manufacturing employment in areas with increasing 
vs. decreasing support probability   
 
Notes: Average changes relative to base year of 1997 in ln(employed) in a geographical area (“ward”). The 
dashed line shows average employment in wards that had an increase in support (as predicted by our policy rule 
IV). The solid line is average manufacturing employment in wards that had a decrease in support (as predicted 
by our policy rule IV).  95% confidence bands also shown. The vertical line in 2000 shows when the change in 
policy occurred. 
 
Figure 4: Changes in unemployment in areas with increasing vs. 
decreasing support probability   
 
Notes: Average changes relative to base year of 1997 in ln(number of unemployed) in a geographical area 
(“ward”). The dashed line shows average unemployment in wards that had an increase in support (as predicted 
by our policy rule IV). The solid line is average unemployment in wards that had a decrease in support (as 
predicted by our policy rule IV). 95% confidence bands also shown. Unemployment is measured by those 
claiming Unemployment Insurance (Job Seekers Allowance). The vertical line in 2000 shows when the change 
in policy occurred.  
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Table 1: Number of areas (wards) eligible for different maximum investment subsidies (NGE) pre and post policy change in 2000  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Rate after 2000 
 Rate in 1993-99 Total 0% 10% 15% 20% 30% 35% 
(1) 0% 7,309 6,823 26 192 72 15 181 
(2) 20% 2,012 841 102 539 33 118 379 
(3) 30% 1,416 265 16 30 717 0 388 
 Total 10,737 7,929 144 761 822 133 948 
 
Notes: Table shows the numbers of wards in different regimes before and after the 2000 policy change. For example, it illustrates that of the 1,416 wards who were eligible 
for the maximum investment subsidy of 30% pre-2000 (column (1)), 388 became eligible for the maximum subsidy of 35% after 2000 (column (7)) and 265 lost their 
eligibility for subsidies completely (column (2)). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Years Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. #Units 
Panel A. All areas       
NGE (Maximum Investment Subsidy 
%) 
97-99 0.1 0.1 32,211 10,737 
 
00-04 0.1 0.1 53,685 10,737 
Average RSA Payment (£) 
97-99 18,265.2 
197,95
5 
32,211 10,737 
 
00-04 9,837.1 
134,03
6 
53,685 10,737 
Total Unemployment (claimant count) 97-99 113.5 150.6 32,211 10,737 
 
00-04 80.9 112.5 53,685 10,737 
Manufacturing Employment 97-99 267.4 626.2 32,211 10,737 
 
00-04 233.0 535.9 53,685 10,737 
Panel B. Areas Eligible for RSA subsidies  
NGE (Maximum Investment Subsidy 
%) 97-99 0.2413 0.0492 10,284 
 
3,428 
 00-04 0.2367 
0.0889
6 14,040 
2,808 
Average RSA Payment (£) 97-99 56,132.2 
346,82
7 10,284 
3,428 
 00-04 35,712.8 
260,03
9 14,040 
2,808 
Total Unemployment (claimant count) 97-99 161.85 179.04 10,284 3,428 
 00-04 123.85 147.95 14,040 2,808 
Manufacturing Employment 97-99 350.96 823.91 10,284 3,428 
 00-04 338.10 745.40 14,040 2,808 
Panel C. Plant –Level      
Plant employment across all areas 97-99 21.2 102.30 406,615 167,415 
 00-04 19.8 91.90 631,089 183,061 
Plant employment across eligible areas 97-99 27.4 139.00 131,431 53,575 
 00-04 26.8 125.85 176,902 50,926 
Panel D. Characteristics of recipients and non-recipients in eligible areas (£), Firms 
Employment of recipients  97-04 87.2 323.4 16,413 4,550 
Employment of non- recipients  97-04 31.3 199.6 188,899 39,308 
Investment of recipients  97-04 1,717.0 
105,68
6 3048 
1,488 
Investment of non- recipients  97-04 953.3 8,001 15,314 7,449 
(Value added/ worker) - recipients   97-04 38.6 
25
.8 3048 
1,488 
(Value added/worker) non recipients 97-04 44.9 231.51 15,314 7,449 
TFP of recipients (Indexed to industry × 
year average in logs) 
  97-04 -0.042 0.371 3,048 1,488 
TFP of non- recipients (Indexed to 
industry × year average in logs) 
97-04 
      -0.015 
       
0.414 
15,314 7,449 
      
Notes: TFP is computed using a Solow residual “factor share” method and relative to an industry × year average 
(see Appendix C).  
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Table 3: Estimates of parameters on eligibility rule changes 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Main specification Restricted variables  
 Year 1993 2000 1993 2000 
Dependent Variable: level of NGE ordered variable   
GDP per capita  -0.022 -0.040 -0.034 -0.055 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population density  -0.028 -0.034 -0.043 -0.015 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of high skilled workers -0.584 -1.438 -0.904 -2.268 
 (0.129) (0.149) (0.125) (0.142) 
Business Start-up  rate  -2.414  -0.490  
 (0.240)  (0.183)  
Structural  unemployment rate  83.251 32.681   
 
(2.483) (2.315)   
Activity rate  -1.147 -1.934 -1.235 -1.879 
 (0.250) (0.263) (0.237) (0.252) 
Employment rate  -8.201  -11.259 
  (0.462)  (0.444) 
Current unemployment rate  -9.148 18.276 84.330  
(claimant count) (3.240) (3.565) (1.846)  
ILO unemployment  rate   -5.682  -0.122 
  (0.824)  (0.760) 
Long-duration unemployment  0.472  5.501  
Rate (1.216)  (1.163)  
Share of manufacturing workers   -1.122  -1.870 
 
 (0.202)  (0.196) 
Observations (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Cut-off 10% 
0.000 -9.503 -0.579 -14.697 
 
(0.220) (0.420) (0.210) (0.377) 
Cut-off 15%     
 1.202 -9.426 0.478 -14.629 
Cut-off 20% (0.221) (0.420) (0.210) (0.377) 
     
Cut-off 30%  -8.938  -14.201 
  (0.419)  (0.375) 
Cut-off 35%     
  -8.272  -13.600 
Log Likelihood -5525.405 -6879.521 -6126.595 -7325.151 
Notes: Coefficients (robust standard errors) from Ordered Probits of NGE maximum support categories for 
1993 and 2000. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) takes values of 1 to 3 depending on the level of NGE 
(zero, 20% and 30%) and in columns (2) and (4) a value of 1 to 6 (zero, 10%, 15%, 20%, 30% and 35%). See 
Online Appendix Table A2 for variable definitions. “Restricted variables” drops (collinear) structural 
unemployment in columns (3) and (4) and claimant unemployment in column (4). 
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Table 4: Area Level regressions – Instrumenting Maximum Investment 
Subsidies (NGE) with Rule change  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.124   0.953 
NGE (0.070)   (0.260) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.839 0.881  
  (0.228) (0.033)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.137   -0.414 
NGE (0.024)   (0.078) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.365 0.881  
  (0.069) (0.033)  
C. Dependent variable: ln(Non-Manufacturing  Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.006   0.177 
NGE (0.044)   (0.161) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.156 0.881  
  (0.141) (0.033)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the area (ward) level.  NGE (“Net 
Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. All columns include a full set of 
linear (lagged) characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993 (
,93rX ). The time period is 1997-2004. Policy 
Rule instrument is described in text. All variables are in differences relative to the base year of 1997.  
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Table 5: Area Level – Instrumenting amount of subsidy with Rule change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
ln(RSA subsidy) 0.012   0.288 
 (0.002)   (0.134) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.839 2.909  
  (0.228) (1.140)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
ln(RSA subsidy) -0.002   -0.125 
RSA (0.001)   (0.053) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.365 2.909  
  (0.069) (1.140)  
C. Dependent variable: ln(Non-Manufacturing  Employment) 
ln(RSA subsidy) 0.001   0.054 
RSA (0.002)   (0.052) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.156 2.909  
  (0.141) (1.140)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the area (ward) level. RSA subsidy is 
the amount of subsidy (in thousands of pounds) that an area receives on average per year; i.e. for every area and 
for the post- and pre-2000 period we sum the subsidy amount and divide by the number of years in the period. 
All columns include a full set of linear (lagged) characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993 (𝑋𝑟,93). The 
time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. All variables are in differences relative to 
the base year of 1997. 
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Table 6: Area Level regressions accounting for Structural Funds (SF)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Method OLS 
Reduced 
Form 
First Stage 
NGE 
First Stage 
SF 
IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment)  
Maximum investment  0.098    0.999 
Subsidy, NGE (0.081)    (0.328) 
Structural Fund, SF 0.038    -0.029 
 (0.037)    (0.079) 
NGE IV  0.792 0.816 0.805  
  (0.224) (0.034) (0.067)  
Structural Fund IV  0.094 0.124 1.029  
  (0.059) (0.011) (0.026)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment)  
Maximum investment  -0.099    -0.409 
subsidy, NGE (0.027)    (0.098) 
Structural Fund -0.061    -0.050 
 (0.012)    (0.027) 
NGE IV  -0.374 0.816 0.805  
  (0.066) (0.034) (0.067)  
Structural Fund IV  -0.103 0.124 1.029  
  (0.021) (0.011) (0.026)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the area (ward) level. NGE (“Net 
Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. SF (“Structural Funds”) is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an area is eligible for SF support. NGE IV is the policy rule change instrument we 
introduced before. Structural Funds IV is a rule change instrument that is computed in a similar way as NGE IV, 
except that rather than NGE eligibility we use SF eligibility (see text). All columns include a full set of linear 
(lagged) characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993. The time period is 1997-2004. All variables are in 
differences relative to the base year of 1997. 
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Table 7: Controlling for Other policies (in Employment Regressions) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Ln(Manufacturing Employment)  
A. Reduced Form      
Policy Rule IV 0.900 0.824 0.840 0.837 0.813 0.831 0.815 0.768 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228) (0.231) (0.232) 
Employment  -0.037      -0.024 -0.029 
Zones (0.025)      (0.025) (0.025) 
Coalfield  -0.052     -0.057 -0.058 
Regeneration 
Trust 
 (0.021)     (0.020) (0.020) 
Regional Venture    0.031    0.023 0.026 
Capital Funds   (0.018)    (0.018) (0.018) 
Enterprise Grants    -0.003   -0.009 -0.012 
    (0.015)   (0.016) (0.016) 
New Deal for      -0.046  -0.057 -0.051 
Communities     (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) 
Devolution to      -0.029 -0.041 -0.055 
Wales & Scotland      (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Structural Fund          0.134 
IV        (0.063) 
B. IV      
NGE 1.090 0.943 0.954 0.972 0.914 0.931 0.966 0.895 
 (0.277) (0.262) (0.260) (0.266) (0.259) (0.255) (0.274) (0.319) 
Employment  -0.074      -0.048 -0.053 
Zones (0.028)      (0.027) (0.028) 
Coalfield  -0.03     -0.040 -0.040 
Regeneration 
Trust 
 (0.022)     (0.021) (0.021) 
Regional Venture    0.044    0.032 0.034 
Capital Funds   (0.018)    (0.018) (0.018) 
Enterprise Grants    0.033   0.018 0.019 
    (0.019)   (0.018) (0.018) 
New Deal for      -0.059  -0.080 -0.077 
Communities     (0.023)  (0.023) (0.024) 
Devolution to      -0.072 -0.075 -0.076 
Wales & Scotland      (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Structural Fund        0.055 
        (0.075) 
Number of areas 10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the area (ward) level. NGE (“Net 
Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. The time period is 1997-2004. 
NGE Policy Rule IV is described in text. Panel A has a specification identical to column (2) in Panel A of Table 
4 except additional policy variables have been included (see text). Panel B has a specification identical to 
column (4) in Panel A of Table 4 except additional policy variables have been included (see text). All variables 
are in differences relative to the base year of 1997. 
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Table 8: Higher level of aggregation - Travel to Work Area (TTWA) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.538   1.006 
NGE (0.114)   (0.319) 
Policy Rule Instrument  1.053 1.047  
  (0.362) (0.222)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.263   -0.803 
NGE (0.062)   (0.265) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.840 1.047  
  (0.249) (0.222)  
Number of areas (TTWAs) 322 322 322 322 
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the TTWA.  NGE (“Net Grant 
Equivalent”) is the level of the employment weighted average maximum investment subsidy rate in the area. 
Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (TTWA level) in all columns. All columns include a full 
set of linear (lagged) characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993. The time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule 
instrument is described in text. All variables are in differences relative to the base year of 1997. 
 
  
 47 
Table 9: Number of Manufacturing Plants as an outcome 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Number of manufacturing Plants) 
Method: OLS 
Reduced 
Form First Stage IV 
 
A. Baseline 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.025   0.209 
NGE (0.033)   (0.106) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.184 0.881  
  (0.094) (0.033)  
B. RSA subsidy levels 
ln(RSA subsidy) 0.003   0.063 
 (0.001)   (0.039) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.184 2.909  
  (0.094) (1.140)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
C. Including Structural Funds in baseline First Stage  
   NGE SF  
Maximum investment  -0.062    0.097 
Subsidy, NGE (0.036)    (0.135) 
Structural Fund 0.037    0.047 
 (0.017)    (0.034) 
NGE IV  0.117 0.816 0.805  
  (0.093) (0.034) (0.067)  
Structural Fund IV  0.060 0.124 1.029  
  (0.026) (0.011) (0.026)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737           10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896           85,896 85,896 85,896 
D. Travel to Work Area 
Max. investment subsidy,  -0.036   0.029 
NGE IV (0.053)   (0.126) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.030 1.047  
  (0.132) (0.222)  
Number of areas (wards) 322 322 322 322 
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 
 
Notes: NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. The time 
period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule IV is described in text. Panel A has a specification identical to Panel A of 
Table 4 except the dependent variable is the ln(Number of manufacturing plants in area+1). Panel B corresponds 
to Table 5, Panel C to Table 6 and Panel D to Table 8. All variables are in differences relative to the base year of 
1997. 
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Table 10: Plant Level employment regressions, splits by firm size  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Method OLS 
Reduced 
Form First Stage IV 
A. Pooled across all plants, 653,385 observations on 96,768 plants; 9,975 wards 
Maximum investment subsidy 
0.011   0.463 
NGE 
(0.025)   (0.089) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
 0.312 0.675  
 
 (0.058) (0.040)  
B. Small (Plants in Firm with under 50 employees), 594,356 observations on 87,728 plants; 9,883 
wards 
Maximum investment subsidy 
0.006   0.441 
NGE 
(0.026)   (0.095) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
 0.299 0.678  
 
 (0.063) (0.040)  
C. Large (Plants in Firms with over 50 employees), 59,025 observations on 9,036 plants; 3,708 
wards 
Maximum investment subsidy 
0.027   0.070 
NGE 
(0.055)   (0.203) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
 0.045 0.642  
  (0.130) (0.050)  
Notes: NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area.  Standard 
errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. All columns include a full set of 
linear (lagged) characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993. The time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule 
instrument is described in text. All variables are in differences relative to the base year of 1997. 
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Table 11: Firm Level – Effects on jobs, investment, output and TFP. 
Instrumenting maximum investment subsidy with Rule change  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Employment),Full Sample (449,514 observations, 91,546 firms) 
NGE 0.039   0.670 
 (0.024)   (0.078) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.493 0.735  
  (0.057) (0.011)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Employment), ARD sub-sample (45,511 observations, 21,389 firms) 
NGE 0.163   0.564 
 (0.057)   (0.168) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.444 0.787  
  (0.132) (0.032)  
C. Dependent variable: ln(Capital Investment), ARD sub-sample (45,511 observations, 21,389 
firms) 
NGE 0.249   1.668 
 (0.304)   (0.750) 
Policy Rule Instrument  1.313 0.787  
  (0.588) (0.032)  
D. Dependent variable: ln(Output), ARD sub-sample (45511 observations, 21389 firms) 
NGE 0.031   0.399 
 (0.065)   (0.182) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.314 0.787  
  (0.143) (0.032)  
E. Dependent variable: ln(TFP), ARD sub-sample (45,511 observations, 21,389 firms) 
NGE -0.034   -0.071 
 (0.043)   (0.099) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.056 0.787  
  (0.078) (0.032)  
Notes: Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. Policy Rule 
instrument is described in text. The time period is 1997-2004. TFP is computed using a “factor share” method 
and relative to an industry × year average (see Appendix C). All columns include a full set of linear (lagged) 
characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993. All variables are in differences relative to the base year of 
1997. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX TO
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“Some causal effects of an industrial policy” by Chiara Criscuolo, Ralf 
Martin, Henry G. Overman and  John Van Reenen 
 
 
APPENDIX A: MORE DETAILS OF THE RSA POLICY 
 
During the period of our study, Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) was the main business support scheme in 
the UK.
2
 Since the early 1970s, RSA provided discretionary investment grants to firms in disadvantaged regions 
typically characterized by relatively low levels of per capita GDP, high unemployment and general labor market 
weaknesses (“Assisted Areas”).3 It was designed to “create and safeguard employment”. Assistance could be 
provided to establish a new business, to expand, modernize or rationalize an existing business, to set up research 
and development facilities or to move from development to production. 
Because RSA had the potential to distort competition and trade between European countries, it had to 
comply with European Union (EU) legislation concerning state aid. Except in certain cases European law 
prohibits this type of assistance. Article 87(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (formerly Article 92(3) of the Treaty 
of Rome) allows for state aid in support of the EU’s regional development objectives. The guidelines designate 
very deprived “Tier 1 Areas” (formerly, “Development Areas”) in which higher rates of grant can be offered 
and somewhat less deprived “Tier 2 Areas” (formerly, “Intermediate Areas”) where lower rates of investment 
subsidy were offered.
4
 There is an upper threshold of support called maximum Net Grant Equivalent (NGE)
5
 
that essentially sets a maximum proportion of the firm’s investment that can be subsidized by the government.  
Since the main formulae that determine eligibility are decided periodically at the European level, and 
not at the Member State level, this mitigates concerns of endogeneity of policy decisions to a local area. In 
addition, although the UK government has latitude to decide the overall amount of the annual budget for RSA, it 
must stick to the EU rules when deciding which areas are eligible to receive RSA. Thus, changes to area-level 
eligibility are the key form of identification in our paper. 
A.1 Changes in eligibility over time 
The map of the areas eligible for RSA changes about once every seven years.
6
 The maps were changed in 1984, 
1993, 2000 and 2006. In the paper, we focus on the 2000 change because we could not (despite extensive 
investigation) discover the exact variables used in determining area eligibility in 1984 and previous years. 
Without this, we could not construct the rules change IV for the 1993 change, although we do show OLS results 
over the longer 1986-2004 period for manufacturing employment. There were changes in the way that the 
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 All notation is consistent within Appendices, but some Greek symbols are used to refer to different objects 
between Appendices. 
2
 We discuss our choice of study period below. According to Harris and Robinson (2005), in 1998/9 RSA 
represented 19% of the UK’s industrial policy spending.  
3
 In April 2004, in England, the RSA scheme was rebranded as the “Selective Finance for Investment Scheme” 
and then “Grants for Business Investment”. It is still called RSA in Scotland and Wales. Productivity became an 
official objective with the move from RSA to Selective Finance for Investment and remains an objective of 
Grant for Business Investment. 
4 
Article 87 of the Treaty of Amsterdam supersedes Article 93 of the Treaty of Rome which had previously 
governed State Aid. Article 87(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam defines conditions where State aid may be 
compatible with EU laws. Article 87(3) (a) allows for “aid to promote the economic development of areas where 
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment” [Tier 1 or Development 
Areas] and Article 87(3) (c) allows for: “aid to facilitate the development of economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest.” [Tier 2 or Intermediate Areas] Additional restrictions apply to sectors with over-capacity: 
motor vehicles, synthetic fibres and yarns, iron and steel, coal, fishery and agricultural products. 
5 
The Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) of aid is the benefit accruing to the recipient from the grant after payment of 
taxes on company profits. RSA grants must be entered in the accounts as income and are made subject to tax. 
Details for calculations of NGEs are available in the Commission’s Official Journal C74/19 10.03.1998. 
6
 Note that this happens in conjunction with the periodic revision of the Structural Funds, the EU’s main policy 
for supporting economic development in less prosperous regions. Although the maps are different for RSA and 
Structural Funds, it is a potentially confounding influence that we consider carefully as discussed in the main 
text (subsection V.B) 
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SAMIS administrative data were gathered after 2004, so we end our sample period in 2004 and cannot easily 
use the 2006 change. We begin the regression analysis in 1997 for two reasons. First, unemployment data is 
unavailable on a consistent basis at the ward level before this year. Second, the electronic business register (the 
IDBR administrative data – see Online Appendix C and main text) was introduced in 1994 and the first few 
years have reliability concerns. The data is comprehensive since 1997. Nevertheless, our results are broadly 
robust to beginning the analysis in earlier years than 1997 (for example, see Online Appendix Tables A7 and 
A11). 
The map of the eligible areas is determined by using a series of quantitative indicators. The level of 
GDP per capita, unemployment and population density are key indicators that have been used in all years. A 
series of additional indicators is also used, and the EU determines what these are and what years are used for 
their values – these are detailed in Online Appendix Table A2. The eligibility criteria are outlined in guidelines 
that are published before the implementation of the map (in our case 1998). The UK government will then 
gather quantitative information on indicators at the relevant area level and will propose a new map that has to be 
approved by the EU. The changes before and after 2000 is shown in Figure 1 and Criscuolo et al (2006) shows 
the map changes at other points in time. 
(a) The 1993 change 
The assisted area map for RSA was re-drawn in 1993 based on the 1988 guidelines using “Travel to Work 
Areas” as the underlying spatial units.7 The Assisted Areas fell into two categories: (a) Development Areas 
(later called Tier 1) where aid could be granted up to a maximum of 30% NGE (Net Grant Equivalent - see 
above) and (b) Intermediate Areas (later called Tier 2) where aid was limited to 20% NGE. The new 1993 maps 
implied a net reduction in the number of assisted areas with Development Areas covering 17%, and Intermediate 
Areas covering 19%, of the total UK population.  
(b) The change in 2000 
The EU Commission introduced new guidelines for State Aid in 1998, and the UK responded to that with the 
introduction of a new Assisted Area map in 2000. The number of indicators rose from eight in 1993 to nine in 
2000. The most disadvantaged areas were re-named “Tier 1” - Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, Merseyside, 
South Yorkshire and West Wales and the Valleys. The maximum investment subsidy allowed in these areas was 
35% NGE. “Tier 2” areas were more scattered and were constructed based on groups of electoral wards.8 Within 
Tier 2 areas, the map identified four sub-tier areas eligible for different level of maximum NGE: 30%, 20%, 
15% or 10%.  
A.2 Formal criteria for receipt of RSA 
During our study period (1997-2004), RSA targeted manufacturing sectors. The grants were discretionary, and 
firms could only apply if the supported project satisfied the following criteria. (a) Location: The project had to 
be undertaken in an Assisted Area. (b) Investment: It had to involve capital expenditure on property, plant or 
machinery; (c) Jobs: It should normally have been expected to lead to the creation of new employment or 
directly protect jobs of existing workers which would otherwise have been lost; (d) Viability: The project should 
be viable and should help the business become more competitive; (e) Need: The applicant had to demonstrate 
that assistance was necessary for the project to proceed as envisaged in terms of nature, scale, timing or 
location;
9
 (f) Prior Commitments: As RSA could only be offered when the project could not proceed without it, 
the Department of Business (BIS)  must have completed its appraisal and issued a formal offer of assistance 
before the applicant entered into any commitment to proceed with the project; (g) Other Funding: The greater 
part of the funding for the project should be met by the applicant or other sources in the private sector. Note that 
location, which forms the basis for our instrumental variables, is objective, clearly defined and enforceable. 
The process for application was as follows. Firms completed an application form, in which they needed 
to prove additionality, to provide business plans, accounts and reasons for wanting the grant. They then 
submitted this to the local office of the Department of Business. During the period analyzed, the lag between 
submission and decision was normally between 35 and 60 days for standard grants, and 100 days or more for 
                                                 
7
 Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) are defined by the UK Office for National Statistics. The fundamental criterion 
is that, of the resident economically active population, at least 75% work in the area, and that of everyone 
working in the area; at least 75% live in the area. 
8
 The data used for the boundaries come from the 1991 Census of Population. A detailed list of the assisted 
wards by local authority within regions and the NGEs to which they are eligible is available upon request.  
9
 This may be to meet a funding gap, to reduce the risks associated with the project, or to influence the choice of 
location of a mobile project. It might also be to obtain parent company approval by meeting established 
investment criteria; or for some other acceptable reason. Each case is considered on its own merits. 
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grants above £2 million. The lag depended on the amount applied for, the time needed to ensure that all the 
criteria were met and on negotiations between the government agency and the firm. If the application was 
successful, the firm was paid the minimum necessary to get the project going. Additional payments started only 
after jobs were created/safeguarded and capital expenditure defrayed and were based on agreed targets. The 
payments were given in instalments – between two and seven and usually spread across more than one financial 
year. The government agency monitored the project with visits (normally one per year, but more frequently for 
risky projects). 
 
APPENDIX B: THE ROLE OF CHANGES IN THE CRITERIA IN 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR RSA  
 
As noted in the main text, to deal with the issue that areas may be endogenously selected into being eligible for 
investment subsidies we use an instrument based on the probability that an area is assigned, based solely on the 
EU wide rule changes rather than changing area characteristics. There are two practical issues in implementing 
this IV. First, although the elements of the X vector determining eligibility for different subsidy levels are 
known, the exact policy parameters that determine eligibility are not. A second issue is that the maximum 
subsidy differs in the eligible areas according to the severity of disadvantage. For example, after 2000 an area 
could fall into several categories with a maximum support share of 10%, 15%, 20%, 30% or 35% percent. 
Before 2000, there were two maximum support categories: 20% and 30%.  
We proceed by defining a latent variable 𝑠𝑟,𝜏
∗   for area 𝑟 and the two time-periods τ which captures how the 
European Commission determines how disadvantaged an area is. The threshold cut-offs will determine which of 
the different maximum support level categories (NGEs) an area is to be placed in. In 2000 and after there are six 
bins (including zero) and before 2000, there were three bins. We keep to the same notation as in the main text in 
Section III, even though for simplicity there we discussed this issue in terms of a binary outcome, whereas now 
we are using the fact that we have multiple categories. 
To construct instruments that are only driven by changes in the rules rather than changes in area conditions 
during the period we run two ordered probit regressions for the pre and post 2000 periods. Our vector of area 
characteristics 𝑋𝑟,93 includes all variables that were used by the EU for deciding about support status in the pre-
2000 and post-2000 periods. However, we only estimate using values of the X variables dated prior to 1993 as 
used in 1993 rule change (in fact, given the lag structure used by the EU, the most recently date considered is 
1991 – see Online Appendix Table A2). This is because using values dated after 1993 could potentially be 
endogenous (recall equation (5) in the main text). This makes the estimates of the policy rule less precise, but so 
long as there is sufficient power in the first stage then the instruments will be valid.  
Formally, the model is: 
 
*
, ,93 ,r r rs X       where  τ = {93,00} 
 
Where 𝑠𝑟,𝜏
∗   are the latent variables of “disadvantage” in area r at time τ; and there are threshold parameters, 
𝜇𝑗(𝜏),𝜏that will determine which subsidy regime j an area falls into. For example, in 1993, the ordered probit 
structure is that the observed ,93 0rs   if 
*
,93 0,93rs  , ,93 1rs   if  
*
0,93 ,93 1,93rs   , and ,93 2rs   if 
*
,93 1,93rs  . The observed bins correspond to different levels of maximum subsidy, ,jc    where j = 1,…, J is 
an indicator for a bin. So in 1993 
0,93 1,930, 0.2c c   and 2,93 0.3c  . Denote the full parameter vector 
1, ,{ , }j     ,which are the “weights” and the “thresholds” respectively. 
We report results from the estimation of the ordered probits in Table 3. The signs generally look broadly 
sensible (with the caveat that these are not marginal effects). For example, areas with higher GDP per person, 
lower labor force activity rates, lower population densities and higher long-duration unemployment are more 
likely to be high investment subsidy areas. 
From these ordered probit estimates we obtain the predicted probabilities ?̂?𝑗,𝑟,𝜏 of falling into each bin in 
each year for each area given their observables 𝑋𝑟,93 and the estimated parameters ?̂?𝜏 . We then create the 
predicted level of subsidy as: 
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𝑧𝑟,  =
{
 
 
 
 ,00 , ,00
ˆ
j j r
j
c P  𝑖𝑓 𝜏 =  2000
,93 , ,93
ˆ
j j r
j
c P   𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = 1993
 
This specification has the advantage that we can interpret reduced form coefficients in a similar way as 
regressions of the actual support status (NGE). The IV we use in our baseline specifications is the change in this, 
∆𝑧𝑟,  , the change in the predicted level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. The distribution of the 
levels and changes of 𝑧𝑟,   are in Figures A1 and A2. 
We experimented with many other ways of constructing the IV to make sure that nothing hinges on 
modelling details and our results are robust. For example, in Online Appendix Table A18 we report our main 
results using instruments constructed from predictions of a linear probability model of the NGE values rather 
than the ordered probit of NGE categories. We also estimated models using ordered logit as well as simple logit 
and probit specifications on the binary event of a non-zero NGE value in an area.  
 
APPENDIX C: MORE DETAILS ON DATA, MATCHING AND 
PRODUCTIVITY CALCULATION 
C.1 The Datasets  
We use administrative data on RSA program participants (SAMIS) with data from the Interdepartmental 
Business Register (IDBR), which contains both the names of the businesses and the identification numbers used 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to conduct the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI).
10
 The IDBR is a list 
of all businesses in the UK, their addresses, type of activity and ownership structure. The list is compiled using a 
combination of tax records, accounting information (every UK firm must lodge some information at Companies 
House). The smallest unit in the IDBR is a site that contains name, address and information on the number of 
employees and industry. We also know the enterprise (firm) that owns the site and whether this is part of a 
larger group (“enterprise group”). Investigation showed that some of the most micro-units (the sites identifiers) 
are not reliable over time; we grouped all sites of a firm in a Ward into a single “local unit” which we refer to as 
a “plant” in the text. 
A stratified random sample of enterprises is drawn every year from the IDBR to form the sampling 
frame for the ABI (Annual Business Inquiry), the mandatory annual survey of UK businesses. Data from the 
ABI is made available to researchers in the form of the ARD (Annual Respondents Database), which provides 
information on output, investment, intermediate inputs, employment, wages, etc.
11
 The ARD is similar to the US 
Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) with the caveat it covers all sectors (not just manufacturing) and is at a 
higher level of aggregation than the plant-level ASM. Not only is the ARD a sub-sample of the population 
IDBR, but the information is reported at a more aggregated level across the entire firm (“reporting unit”), rather 
than at the plant (“local unit”) level. For example, a firm with two 10 workers plants in two different wards will 
have only total employment reported in the ARD (20 workers), whereas the IDBR will identify both local units. 
Note that in about 80% of all cases a firm is single plant and located entirely at a single address.  
The upshot is that whereas employment can be matched exactly to an area, so we can analyze at 
whatever level we like (e.g. plant, firm or ward); the analysis of investment and productivity for a representative 
sample can only be accurately conducted at the firm level, and not a lower level. Note that the ARD contains the 
population of larger businesses (those over 100 or 250 employees depending on the exact year) and accounts for 
around 90% of total UK manufacturing employment. 
 
C2. Matching Datasets 
Since the performance data comes from sources unrelated to program participation, several problems arise in 
matching.  The Department of Business uses name and postcodes from its administrative SAMIS data to match 
a list of participants and applicants to the population IDBR.  This matching may occur at the plant-level or the 
firm level. Often a firm will apply for funding; so that we cannot know for sure whether a plant has benefitted 
from RSA receipt (although for the 80% of single-firm plants there is never an ambiguity). Thus, one measure 
of program participation is simply whether a plant was in a firm that received any RSA (which we can always 
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 The IDBR was introduced between 1994 and 1995. Previously, that sampling was based on a Business 
Register maintained by the Office of National Statistics. 
11
 Stratification is broadly based on industry affiliation, regional location and size. For details, see Criscuolo et 
al. (2003). 
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define precisely). For a small number of cases, the same SAMIS identifier could match to multiple IDBR firms. 
In these cases we aggregated the IDBR firms together, but we checked the results were robust to dropping these 
few cases (they were). The ARD is a strict sub-set of the IDBR, so the issues discussed above apply in the same 
way to this dataset. 
The SAMIS database has information on 54,322 program applications and whether the application was 
successful. Applicant numbers declined in the 2000s as the total budget for RSA fell. Using name, postcode and 
CRN numbers, the information in BIS files was linked to the IDBR over the whole period. The matching rate 
was 82% over the sample period (1997-2004).  
There is a variety of reasons for non-matches. The most common reason is that the information on the 
SAMIS database of RSA participants is inadequately detailed to form a reliable match to the IDBR. It is also 
possible that the IDBR misses some of the smaller and shorter-lived firms who receive RSA. To check biases 
arising from matching we conducted a detailed comparison of the characteristics of projects and project 
participants of firms that BIS matched with IDBR relative to all the projects in the SAMIS database. The 
analysis shows that the set of “IDBR matches” do not significantly differ from the rest of the projects in the 
database on observed characteristics, and this is the case for both unsuccessful and successful applications. The 
variables we considered in the regression were application amounts; headquarter location, a dichotomous 
variable that is one if the application was handled by the London office of BIS, foreign owned, and a BIS code 
that seeks to identify “internationally mobile” jobs. More details are available from the authors and in Criscuolo 
et al (2006). 
The area level average subsidy rates used in Table 5 are generated from aggregating up all subsidies 
granted to plants in ward in the two periods (1997-1999 and 2000-2004) and then dividing by the number of 
years in each sub-period.  
C.3 Firm Size Definition 
In some of the analysis, we split by firm size (e.g. Table 10). To mitigate endogeneity concerns we use firm size 
as measured by employment in a base period, for which we choose 1996, the year before our estimation period. 
For all plants belonging to a firm who were not alive in 1996 we use the year of birth to determine the size class 
and exclude data from the first year in our regressions of employment. We also experimented with dropping 
post-1996 entrants, which led to very similar results.  
C.4 TFP (Total Factor Productivity) measures 
There are numerous ways to obtain a TFP measure, a subject of ongoing debate in the literature (see inter alia 
Olley and Pakes, 1996 and Ackerberg et al, 2015). The results in Panel E of Table 11 are based on a simple 
“factor share” method and relative to an industry by year average. We define 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏?̅?(𝑖)𝑡 where  
𝜏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡 − (1 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡)𝑘𝑖𝑡  . In this expression 𝑟𝑖𝑡   is ln(firm revenue) for firm 
𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is ln(materials), 𝑙𝑖𝑡 is ln(employment) and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 is ln(capital). 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡 is the share of materials in 
revenues in the four-digit industry and 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡  is the share of labor costs in revenues at the industry level. 𝜏?̅?(𝑖)𝑡 is 
the average value for 𝜏𝑖𝑡 in year 𝑡 in the four digit industry. 
We also considered alternative ways of computing TFP (see Online Appendix Table A16). Firstly, we 
consider a “regression-based” method where we use ln(revenues) as the dependent variables and include on the 
right-hand side in addition to treatment controls ln(labor), ln(materials) and ln(capital). Secondly, we consider a 
more structural production function estimation approach as proposed in Martin (2012) which takes into account 
firm specific variation in market power when computing TFP. This requires running the following (first stage) 
regression: Ξ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌(Ξ𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 where Ξ𝑖𝑡 =
𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝑖𝑡) −𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝑖𝑡)
𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡
 and 𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡  are 
the variable factor shares at the firm level. From this we can estimate a productivity index as 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑈𝑂𝑀𝐸𝐺𝐴 =
Ξ𝑖𝑡−?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝑘
. 
 
APPENDIX D: AGGREGATING ACROSS SPATIAL UNITS 
 We consider the aggregation from lower (wards) to higher levels area (Travel to Work Areas) as 
discussed in subsection V.C. For simplicity consider the set-up of a single Travel to Work Area (TTWA, 
denoted a, consisting of two wards r and r’ and consider two periods t = 0 and t = 1. It is straightforward to 
generalize this to multiple-ward TTWAs (we do this in the empirical application). Suppose we know that as a 
consequence of the program in period 1, ward r experiences a change of employment of 𝛼𝑟 log points whereas 
ward r’ experiences a change of 𝛼𝑟′ log points; i.e. ln 𝐿𝑟,1 − ln 𝐿𝑟,0 = 𝛼𝑟 and similarly for ward r’. 
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We are interested in what will be the effect of the policy on total employment at the higher TTWA 
level. We can write TTWA employment as the sum of the two wards: 𝐿𝑎,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑟,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑟′,𝑡. Hence the logarithmic 
change in employment is: 
 
 
ln 𝐿𝑎,1 − ln 𝐿𝑎,0 = ln[𝑒
𝛼𝑟𝑤𝑟 + 𝑒
𝛼𝑟′(1 − 𝑤𝑟)] 
 
(D1) 
 
where 𝑤𝑟 =
𝐿𝑟,0
𝐿𝑟,0+𝐿𝑟′,0
  is the share of employment in Ward 1 in period 0. Re-write equation (D1) as:  
 
 
ln[𝑒𝛼𝑟𝑤𝑟 + 𝑒
𝛼𝑟′(1 − 𝑤𝑟)] = 𝛼𝑟′ + ln[(𝑒
𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑟′ − 1)𝑤𝑟 + 1] = 𝜈1 + 𝛼𝑟′ + (𝑒
𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑟′ − 1)𝑤𝑟 
 
Where 𝜈1 is an approximation error that is small for values of  (𝑒
𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑟′ − 1)𝑤𝑟   close to zero. Similarly note 
that (𝑒𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑟′ − 1) = 𝜈2 + ln[(𝑒
𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑟′  − 1) + 1] = 𝜈2 + 𝛼𝑟 − 𝛼𝑟′  for (𝑒
𝛼𝑟−𝛼𝑟′ − 1)  close to zero and where 
𝜈2 is another approximation error.
12
 Consequently, we can write the change in TTWA employment as: 
 
ln 𝐿𝑎,1 − ln 𝐿𝑎,1 ≈ 𝛼𝑟′ + (𝛼𝑟 − 𝛼𝑟′)𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤𝑟𝛼𝑟 + (1 − 𝑤𝑟)𝛼𝑟′ 
 
(D2) 
In other words: the percentage TTWA level change is approximately the percentage change in each ward 
weighed with the employment share of each ward.  
This allows us to examine the case of negative spillovers as well. Suppose region r experiences an 
increase in support Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟 > 0 but there is no change in  ward r’. This leads to a positive effect of 𝛼𝑟 =
𝛽Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟  in region r at the expense of a possible negative spillover of 𝛼𝑟 = −𝜒Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟  in region r’. For the 
aggregate TTWA we would consequently expect the effect on employment to be: 
 
𝛼𝑎 = 𝑤𝑟 𝜆1Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟 − (1 − 𝑤𝑟)𝜒Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟  
 
Indeed, in the case where the policy simply shifts jobs from one ward region to the other we would expect  
 
𝜒 = 𝜆1
𝑤𝑟
1 − 𝑤𝑟
 
 
i.e. if r’ is smaller than r, 𝜒 would be bigger than 𝛽. On the other hand, if we assume that there are no spillovers 
equation (D2) becomes 
 
ln 𝐿𝑎,1 − ln 𝐿𝑎,0 ≈ 𝛼𝑎 = 𝜆1Δ𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑎  (D3) 
 
where 𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑎 = ∑ 𝑤𝑟𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟𝑟 . This implies that if we regress (changes) in TTWA ln(employment) on the 
employment weighted share of area level NGE changes we would expect to recover comparable impact 
estimates as we did when running ward level regressions on (changes) in NGE. By contrast, if there are negative 
spillovers we expect a coefficient smaller than 𝜆1 when running a regression as implied in equation (D3). We 
would also expect some bias towards zero because of the approximation error implied in equation (D3). In our 
empirical estimates at the TTWA level in Table 8, we find treatment effects that look (if anything) larger than 
the ward level 𝛽 estimates in Table 4. This leads us to the conclusion that negative spillovers are not a major 
issue of concern in our application. 
 
 
APPENDIX E: OTHER PLACE-BASED POLICIES 
Our identification strategy uses exogenous policy rule changes that determine which wards are “randomized in” 
to be eligible (or ineligible) for RSA support. The exogenous policy rule change that we use stems from the 
change in the UK assisted area map drawn up to comply with revised EU regulation. One potential threat to 
                                                 
12
 Note that the two errors go in opposite directions with the first one overestimating and the second one 
underestimating the true figure. The second error is also likely larger so that on net we are underestimating the 
true figure. Simulations of the errors suggest that these are under 5%. 
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identification is the existence of other regional policies that use geographical areas to determine eligibility and 
experience similar changes in eligibility at around the same time as the rules for RSA eligibility change. If such 
policies exist, then they may cause us to over-estimate the effect of RSA eligibility if these other policies 
positively affect RSA-eligible areas. In this Appendix, we consider a wide range of place-based policies and 
discuss whether they raise concerns and, if so, how we address these in the paper. Broadly, there appears to be 
only one policy – the Regional Development Fund aspects of EU Structural Funds – that is potentially 
problematic as it has both cross-area variation and rules that changed at the same time as RSA.
13
 
E.I EU Structural Funds (SF) 
The change in the Assisted Areas map for RSA in 2000 coincides with several changes to the EU 
“Structural Funds (SF).” SF are important instruments for delivering EU regional policy mainly through 
infrastructure spending. Total SF spending is higher than RSA, although the direct SF grants to business are an 
order of magnitude smaller than RSA. For example, in 1997 the total amount of RSA grants accepted was 
£158.3 million while the total amount of SF Regional Development was £621 million (House of Commons, 
2000), only £15.6 million of this were Funds for business grants (1997 Annual Report of the Industrial 
Development Act).  
Our data cover two program periods 1997-1999 and 2000-2004. In the earlier period, the EU Structural 
Funds were organized around “objectives.” Broadly, only Objectives 1 and 2 really matter for us.14 Objective 1 
is targeted at the poorest regions. Objective 2 regions are less poor but suffer from high unemployment and/or 
have high shares of employment in declining industries. Objective 1 accounts for about 70% of all SF spending, 
whereas Objective 2 accounts for only 11%.  
The rules for eligibility for Objective 1 were very similar in both periods - a region must have a GDP per 
capita that is below 75% of the EU average.
15
 Objective 1 is defined on the NUTS2 geographical areas whereas 
Objective 2 is defined on smaller units.
 16
 A number of criteria were used to determine eligibility for Objective 2 
that were similar to RSA such as the unemployment rate, the percentage share of manufacturing jobs; falls in 
employment and the fraction of skilled workers. The reference year for which these were taken were sometimes 
different from RSA, however.
17
 One factor determining eligibility for Objective 2 SF that did not determine 
RSA were local crime rates, and we include these variables (robberies, burglaries and drug crimes) when 
predicting which areas were eligible for SF.  
Since the maps for SF and RSA eligibility change at the same time and both are aimed at disadvantaged 
areas, a concern is that the RSA effect may be confounded by the effects of SF. We can observe the maps of 
eligibility for SF and RSA and, in fact there are many differences. There are several reasons for these 
differences. First, the exact weights given to different variables in the policy rule are not the same for RSA and 
SF. Second, the “reference year” used to define the variables is different. Third, the level of aggregation used to 
determine eligibility also differs. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the variables that enter the policy rules 
for RSA and SF are not all the same. Crime rates enter the policy rule for SF but not RSA. Similarly, although 
the structural unemployment, the activity rate, the long-term unemployment rate and the start-up rate of new 
businesses affect whether an area is eligible for RSA at various points of time, they are never in the list of 
variables that determine SF eligibility. 
For example, GDP per capita is a key component for eligibility to Objective 1 SF support and the highest 
investment subsidy rates of RSA (i.e. a “Development Area” or Tier 1 area). Indeed, the maps for eligibility are 
identical 2000-2006 (NUTS2 areas of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly; Merseyside; South Yorkshire; West 
Wales and the Welsh Valleys). However, in the 1993-99 period the two maps differ significantly. The RSA 
Development Areas comprise 123 Travel-To-Work Areas (TTWAs) or parts of such areas. In addition, the only 
                                                 
13
 The bulk of EU transfers to the UK are towards agriculture via the Common Agricultural Policy. Structural 
Funds also include an Agricultural Guidance Fund and a Social Fund (that does not have an explicit regional 
component). Since these are not very relevant for a place-based industrial policy like RSA, we simply refer to 
the Regional Development Fund aspect of SF as “Structural Funds” for brevity in what follows.  
14
 Objectives 3 and 4 were not spatially targeted at particular types of region so are not a threat to identification 
of RSA. Objective 5 was subsumed into Objective 2 after 2000. 
15
 Calculations are based on three-year averages: 1989-1991 for the early period and 1994-1996 for the post-
2000 period. 
16
 To give a better idea of the size of these territorial units consider that in the UK there are 37 NUTS 2, each 
covering between 800,000 and 3,000,000 inhabitants and 133 NUTS 3, each covering between 150,000 and 
800,000 inhabitants. The equivalent in the US could be municipalities or city/county/authorities. Note that the 
geography used for eligibility to RSA are “wards” (NUTS 5) with an average population of about 6,600 people. 
17
 For example, for manufacturing share the reference year was 1975 for the 1993-1999 period and 1985 for the 
2000-2006 period.  
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two regions eligible to Objective 1 support over this period were Merseyside and the Highlands and Islands.
18
 
This is mainly because of a different level of aggregation used to determine RSA compared to SF. 
Online Appendix Table A3 presents the degree of overlap in eligibility for RSA and SF over time to 
illustrate the amounts of non-overlap. Row 1 shows that out of 10,737 wards, 2,424 (22.6%) were eligible for 
both SF and RSA over the 1993-99 period. Of these, 1,743 (71.9%) continued to be eligible for both policies 
after 2000. 681 wards (28.1%) lost eligibility for RSA but maintained eligibility for SF (none of these wards lost 
eligibility for SF or lost eligibility for both types of support). Similarly, rows 2 and 3 look at changes in 
eligibility over time of wards that pre-2000 were eligible for only one type of support (RSA in row 2 and SF in 
row 3). The last row shows that most wards (6,602 or 61.5% of the population) were ineligible for both policies 
pre-2000. Of these 3% subsequently became eligible for both types of support; and 2% for RSA only with the 
majority (95%) remaining ineligible for both.  
Since there may be unobservables that determine whether an area becomes eligible for SF this can create 
endogeneity issues. We can exploit the same identification strategies we use for RSA for SF to deal with this 
problem. Although some of the criteria determining SF are the same as RSA, many are different. For example, 
crime variables affect whether an area is eligible for SF, they do not appear in the criteria determining RSA 
eligibility. Similarly, structural unemployment, the activity rate, the long-term unemployment rate and the start-
up rate of new businesses affect whether an area is eligible for RSA, they are not in the list of variables that 
determine SF eligibility. Hence, analogously to Table 3 we estimate a model where the dependent variable is 
whether an area is eligible for SF in Online Appendix Table A4 separately for the earlier period (1993) and later 
period (2000). The coefficients generally look sensibly signed: areas with lower GDP per capita, less population 
density, more manufacturing and worse job markets are more likely to be eligible for SF. Additionally, five of 
the six crime coefficients suggest that places with more crime are significantly more likely to be eligible for 
structural funds (the only exception is drug crime in 1993). 
Analogously to our strategy for RSA, we use the estimates in Online Appendix Table A4 to build up a “SF 
rules change IV” and enter this alongside our standard specifications in Table 6. We show there that although 
there is a little evidence of beneficial effects of structural funds on unemployment in the reduced forms, the SF 
treatment variable is not significant at the 5% level in the IV specifications for either employment or 
unemployment. More importantly for our purposes, the effect of the RSA policy is robust to inclusion of the SF 
variable (see discussion in subsection V.B in main text).  
 
E.2 Enterprise Grant (EG) Scheme 
Another change that happened in 2000 was a revision in the way Regional Selective Assistance was 
administered to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and for smaller projects. These smaller grants were 
renamed as “Enterprise Grants” (EG). In England and Scotland, EG’s began in January 2000. They were a 
simplified scheme for SMEs in RSA eligible areas. The scheme replaced small-scale RSA grants and provided 
funding up to a maximum of 15% of investment.  
In England (but not Scotland) EGs also became available in “Tier 3” areas (see Figure 4 in 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00343400123609). These Tier 3 areas were outside those eligible 
for assistance under RSA. Small firms (under 50 employees) could receive up to 15% investment subsidies and 
medium sized firms (between 50 and 249 employees) could receive up to 7.5% in Tier 3. In Wales, EGs were 
not introduced until 2002 and then were available throughout the country.  
The aggregate spending on EGs was low compared to RSA. For example, in Scotland in 2001 only £3m 
was spent on EGs, under 3% of the total RSA budget.  
Following our strategy for other area-based policies (see next subsection) we can include a dummy 
variable equal to one when an area becomes eligible for EGs. Although these are generally the same as RSA, the 
introduction of Tier 3 in England in 2000 and the delayed introduction until 2002 in Wales, enables us to 
separately identify their effect.
19
  
This does, however, raise the concern that the larger effect of RSA on plants belonging to small firms 
could be due to EGs. The results in Online Appendix Table A14 cast doubt on this. Here we use the actual 
subsidy amounts (effectively RSA plus EG) and do not find that the results are due to smaller firms receiving 
relatively large grants. However, a data issue is that the Scottish and Welsh (after 2002) subsidies exclude EG, 
                                                 
18
 For example, while Cornwall was not eligible to Objective 1 status; TTWAs such as Penzance and St. Ives or 
Newquay were Development Areas. Similarly, no part of Wales was eligible to Objective 1 aside from part of 
Blaenau Gwent and Abergavenny; Thanet and South Pembrokeshire are Development Areas.  
19
 Note that we have access to the subsidy amounts of EG in England, but not in Scotland or Wales. Since EGs 
were effectively part of the RSA treatment before and after 2000 we consider the reduced form estimates a 
reflection of the “RSA and EG bundle.” However, since we showed in Table 7 that EG had no effect on the 
RSA policy effect; that the EG coefficient itself is small and considering also the aggregate amount spend on 
EG was also relatively small, it is reasonable to assume that our overall estimates are due to RSA. 
9 
 
so could be generating this effect. To check this, we allowed the coefficient on the RSA treatment effect to be 
different in England from in the rest of the sample (Wales and Scotland). If the result were driven by 
measurement error in the subsidy amount, we would expect that the coefficient should be significantly different. 
We found that the interaction terms were not significant (-0.402 with a standard error of 0.625) suggesting that 
this is not a first order issue. 
E.3 Other Area Policies 
Online Appendix Table A19 considers many regional and active labor market policies that operated during 
our estimation period. The Table provides information on the timing of the policy and basic information on area 
eligibility. The clear majority of policies (10 out of 14) are purely national in nature and do not have specific 
local area eligibility.
20
 Thus, the time dummies will control for them.  
Apart from Structural Funds and Enterprise Grants discussed above, there are five other potential policies 
with a geographical area component: Employment Zones, Coalfields Regeneration Trust, New Deal for 
Communities and Regional Venture Capital Funds.  
 
(a) Employment Zones were designated areas of high long-term unemployment where a package of policies 
was delivered aimed at improving the chances of those on long-term unemployment insurance getting back 
into work. The Job Center assessed whether extra training, job subsidies, more intense work search, etc. 
were needed and delivered these with the threat of benefit sanctions. These started in April 2000 and we 
code the 15 designated areas with a dummy equal 1 after 2000 and zero otherwise. The areas are: 
Birmingham, Brent, Brighton and Hove, Doncaster, Glasgow, Haringey, Liverpool and Sefton, Merthyr 
Tydfil (including Caerphilly and Blaenau Gwent), Middlesbrough (including Redcar and Cleveland), 
Newham, North West Wales (Conwy, Denbighshire, Anglesey, Wrexham, Caernarfonshire and 
Merionethshire), Nottingham, Plymouth, Southwark and Tower Hamlets. 
 
(b) The Coalfields Regeneration Trust (http://www.coalfields-regen.org.uk/) contains a set of initiatives 
designed to support areas historically dependent on Coalfields. This includes help on skills, setting up new 
businesses and finding new jobs. This program began in 1999, so the affected areas were coded to be 1 
from 2000 onwards and zero otherwise. The coal-field districts were: Allerdale, Alnwick, Amber Valley, 
Ashfield, Bassetlaw Barnsley, Blaenau Gwent, Blyth Valley, Bolsover, Broxtowe, Caerphilly, Cannock 
Chase, Canterbury, Castle Morpeth, Chesterfield, Chester-le-Street, Clackmannanshire, Copeland, 
Derwentside, Doncaster, Dover, Durham, East Ayrshire, Easington ,Erewash, Fife, Forest of Dean, Gedling, 
Hinckley and Bosworth, Kirklees, Knowsley, Leeds, Lichfield, Mansfield, Melton, Merthyr Tydfil, 
Midlothian, Moorlands, North Lanarkshire, North Warwickshire, North-East Derbyshire, Neath PT, 
Newark and Sherwood, Newcastle-under-Lyme, North Tyneside, Nottingham, Nuneaton and Bedworth, 
NW Leicestershire, Rhondda CT, Rotherham, Rushcliffe, South Derbyshire, South Lanarkshire, Salford, 
Sedgefield, Selby, Sheffield, South Staffordshire, South Tyneside, St Helens, Staffordshire, Stoke-on-Trent, 
Sunderland, Tamworth, Torfaen, Wakefield, Wansbeck, Wear Valley and Wigan. 
   
(c) The New Deal for Communities was targeted at the most deprived areas of England. These were usually very 
small localities, generally on public housing projects, suffering from low employment, high crime and health 
problems. Local public services across different agencies (welfare benefits, housing, health and social care) tried 
to offer “joined up” interventions. The program started in 1998 in 17 areas (ending in 2008), and then another 22 
were added in 1999 (ending in 2011). As usual, we have a dummy that turns on in these years for the relevant 
areas. The communities targeted in round 1 (1998) include: 
Local authority Area wards/estates/communities 
Birmingham Kings Norton  
Bradford Little Horton, Marshfield and West Bowling 
Brighton East Brighton  
Bristol Barton Hill 
Hackney Shoreditch 
Hull Preston Road  
Leicester Braunstone 
Liverpool Kensington  
Manchester Beswick and Openshaw  
                                                 
20
 Some of the policies have small local area pilot schemes. See, for example, Blundell et al (2004) on the New 
Deal for Young People or Koenig et al (2018) on Job Centre Plus. 
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Middlesbrough West Middlesbrough   
Newcastle Upon Tyne Arthur's Hill, Cruddas Park, Rye Hill and Elswick  
Newham West Ham and Plaistow 
Norwich North Earlham, Larkman and Marlpit 
Nottingham Radford and Hyson Green 
Sandwell Greets Green 
Southwark Aylesbury Estate) 
Tower Hamlets Ocean Estate 
 
In Round 2 (1998) the following communities were targeted: 
Local authority Area wards/estates/communities 
Birmingham Aston 
Brent South Kilburn 
Coventry Wood End, Henley Green and Manor Farm 
Derby Derwent 
Doncaster Central Doncaster 
Hammersmith and Fulham North Fulham 
Haringey Seven Sisters  
Hartlepool West Central Hartlepool 
Islington Finsbury 
Knowsley Huyton 
Lambeth Clapham Park 
Lewisham New Cross Gate 
Luton Marsh Farm 
Oldham Hathershaw and Fitton Hill 
Plymouth Devonport 
Rochdale Heywood 
Salford Charlestown and Lower Kersal 
Sheffield Burngreave 
Southampton Thornhill 
Sunderland East End and Hendon 
Walsall Blakenhall 
Wolverhampton All Saints and Blakenhall Community Development  
 
 
 
(d) Regional Venture Capital Funds was national from 2003 but affected two regions (West Midlands and East 
of England) from 2002. The program provided small-scale equity (under £500,000) to firms with “growth 
potential”. We included a dummy which switches on for these two regions in 2002 (the national program is 
in the time dummies).  
 
(e) Devolution to Scotland and Wales. Following successful Referenda, in 1999 greater powers were delegated 
from central government in London to Wales (Government of Wales Act 1998) and Scotland (Scotland Act 
1998). Although the budget allocated to RSA and the administration of the scheme was (partially) 
decentralized, the EU driven determination of eligible and ineligible areas was not changed, so the 
identification scheme we are using is unaffected by these changes. Nevertheless, we included a dummy for 
Wales and Scotland in 1999 and thereafter to control for any effects.
21
  
 
E.4 Summary on “Other Policies” 
 
Table 7 (where the dependent variable is manufacturing employment) and Online Appendix Table A5 (where 
the dependent variable is unemployment) in the main text shows that our RSA effects are robust to all these 
“other policy” controls (including adding in Structural Funds). 
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 Note that in 1999 there were also greater powers to the nine Regional Development Agencies that covered 
contiguous areas in England (Statutory Instrument 1999/672). Any effect from this would be captured by the 
time dummies in the regression with post 1999 Scotland and Wales controls. 
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APPENDIX F: FURTHER RESULTS  
F.1 Spatial Clustering of the Standard Errors 
 
Our main results rely on clustering the standard errors at the ward-level because this is the level where NGE 
eligibility is determined. In the language of Abadie et al (2017) our experimental design delivers quasi-random 
variation at the ward-level, so this is ex ante the appropriate level for clustering. The data underlying the policy 
variables are at a mixture of levels of aggregation (some at the wide NUTS2 level, but others as low as the ward 
level).  
 
 
If treatment eligibility was determined solely by factors at a geographically higher level than the ward level our 
approach could underestimate the correct standard errors. In this section, we explore several more conservative 
clustering approaches. These include: 
 
1. Clusters based on TTWAs (Travel to Work Area)  
2. Clusters based on contiguous neighboring wards receiving identical support levels.  
3. Clusters based on “close” neighboring wards receiving identical support levels 
4. NUTS-2 level clustering 
 
Online Appendix Table A20 reports versions of our main results in Table 4 with errors clustered at these 
different levels. Irrespective of the precise level of clustering we find that our treatment effects are significant at 
5% level or greater for the employment regressions. For unemployment, we lose significance at conventional 
levels only when clustering at the extremely conservative NUTS-2 level (34 clusters). 
In Panel A of Online Appendix Table A20 we simply cluster at the level of the TTWA (322 clusters), 
the least conservative approach in the Table (but more conservative than in Table 4 where clustering is at the 
ward level). In Panel D we cluster at the level of the NUTS2 region (34 clusters), the most conservative 
approach. We also investigated more sophisticated approaches where we created clusters of areas that were 
“close” to each other and had the same level of NGE support in both the pre and post 2000 period. We tried 
several alternatives, two of which we report in the paper. The first of these defined “close” as contiguous wards 
– i.e. we aggregated all wards having a shared boundary and the same level of NGE support in the two periods. 
We use NUTS 2 boundaries to define clusters for wards that receive no support. This gave us 102 clusters in 
total: 70 clusters of wards with positive NGE and another 32 clusters with zero NGE (i.e. no support). Our 
second approach defined “close” as being within 1km of another ward (rather than strictly contiguous) with the 
same NGE. Once again, we used NUTS 2 boundaries to define clusters for wards that receive no support. This 
gave us 80 clusters in total: 48 clusters of wards with positive NGE and another 32 with zero NGE. Both 
approaches are illustrated in Online Appendix Figure A3. Regression results are reported in Panels B and C of 
Online Appendix Table A20. 
In short, our core results appear broadly robust to various ways of dealing with spatial autocorrelation. 
 
F.2 Relationship of Regression Discontinuity Designs to our baseline IV approach 
 
We explore the impact of different levels of support (NGE) on various area r level outcomes at time t. Recall 
our basic model is: 
𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜆1 𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑡 
 
where 𝜖𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜂𝑟 + 𝜈𝑟,𝑡. To deal with area fixed effects that are potentially correlated with treatment our basic 
approach involves identifying 𝜆1 from differences 
 
𝛥𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜆1𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡 
(F1) 
Where 𝛥𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑟,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑟,1997 and there was a change in NGE after 2000. 
While differencing eliminates the fixed effect there is concern that differential trends in the outcome 
variables could affect treatment so that 𝐸{𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡} ≠ 0 . This could be because an area that does more 
poorly in the period leading up to 2000 would be more likely considered in need of support so that 
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𝐸{𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡} < 0. Indeed, the mechanism that leads to this is that the European Commission deems areas 
as disadvantaged and therefore in need of support based on a set of area level characteristics at certain points in 
time. This rule can be described as:  
 
𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = {
𝑓93(𝑋𝑟,93) if 𝑡 < 2000
𝑓00(𝑋𝑟,00)if 𝑡 ≥ 2000
 
(F2) 
where X is a vector of area characteristics, i.e. support levels of NGE are a mapping of local area characteristics. 
For the period between 1993 and 2000 the area characteristics are based on some point in time before 1993, for 
the period from 2000 onwards NGE is based on area characteristics at some point between 1993 and 2000 (see 
Online Appendix Table A2). These include weightings of the different characteristics (including a weight of 
zero for some characteristics in some periods) as well as a variety of thresholds. 
As consequence of this,  
 
𝐸{𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,93, 𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡} = 𝐸{𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,93} for 𝑡 < 2000 
(F3a) 
and 
 
𝐸{𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡} = 𝐸{𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,00} for 𝑡 ≥ 2000 
(F3b) 
 
i.e. NGE is correlated with the error term only because it is in part driven by 𝑋𝑟,00 and 𝑋𝑟,93.  
This in turn implies that if we could observe 𝐸{𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,𝑝} – where period 𝑝 ∈ {93,00} – we could 
obtain an unbiased estimate of 𝜆 from a regression of 
 
𝛥𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜆1𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 + 𝐸{𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93} + 𝛥𝜉𝑟,𝑡 
 
where 𝛥𝜉𝑟𝑡 = 𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡 −  𝐸{𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93} 
 
Of course, we have no way of observing 𝐸{𝛥𝜈𝑟,𝑡|𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93}, directly but since it is driven entirely by 
observables we can use a non-parametric approach to estimate it; i.e. we can run a regression of  
 
𝛥𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜆1𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜙(𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93) + 𝛥𝜉𝑟,𝑡 
(F4) 
 
where 𝜙(𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93) is approximated by a series expansion or similar non-parametric method. Note that 𝜆1 and 
𝜙(𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93) are separately identifiable because 𝛥𝑁𝐺𝐸 is determined by both X variables and EU rules that 
change over time. This is very similar to a regression discontinuity approach where we control for the 
(unknown) running variable 𝜙(𝑋𝑟,00, 𝑋𝑟,93).  
We provide results using this approach in Online Appendix Table A10 for both employment and 
unemployment. The estimates are significant and larger in absolute magnitude than the OLS estimates in Table 
4 column (1). However, they are smaller than our preferred IV results in column (4) of Table 4. 
One reason for this difference could be measurement error in the running variable in equation (F4). The 
measurement error could be simply that the variables we use are not exactly the ones used to determine 
eligibility of an area, because for example at the time the information might have come from an older vintage of 
data than the ones that we are using.  
As is well-known even classical measurement error can create serious biases in RD Designs. This is 
because continuous measurement error smooths over the discontinuity (see Battistin et al, 2009). In many non-
RD design approaches like matching, estimators do converge at a standard rate to a biased value with classical 
measurement error (e.g. Battistin and Cheshire, 2014) and will be negligible for sufficiently small variance of 
the measurement error. By contrast, Davezies and Le Barbanchon (2017) show that in RD Designs even a small 
amount of classical measurement error results in inconsistency of the usual estimator. They show that this seems 
to be important not just in theory, but also in their Monte Carlo evidence and empirical application. The 
standard methods to deal with measurement error in the running variable are not applicable to our context where 
we know neither the true value of the running variable (even for a subset of the data) nor the cut-off (e.g. 
Battistin et al, 2009; Porter and Yu, 2015).  
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The advantage of the IV strategy we pursue in the main part of the paper is that the instrument may 
contain classical measurement error, but it will not cause bias so long as the instruments are not weak. And we 
showed the strength of instruments through standard techniques such as F-statistic in the first stage. 
 
F.3 A RD Design in Levels? 
 
Although we have described a potential RD Design in terms of differences in equation (F4), one could also 
imagine an RD Design using levels of the variables as in equation (F2). Consider the model in the period before 
the 2000 policy change (the same issues arise for post-2000): 
 
𝑦𝑟,𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑓( 𝑋𝑟,93) + 𝑣𝑟,𝑡 
 
Moment condition (F3a) implies that we can consistently identify 𝜆 under the usual RD assumptions. If we 
considered NGE as a discrete dummy (eligibility vs. non-eligibility), then the RD is considering areas “just 
above” the surface 𝑓( 𝑋𝑟,93)  where an area becomes eligible to areas “just below” the surface. The problem 
however is that we observe neither the running variable nor the cut-off. But we do observe all the elements of 
the running variable  𝑋𝑟,93. Thus, one might think the cut-off for the surface could be identified empirically from 
the data.  
Unfortunately, the complexity of the rules (plus potentially measurement error in the X’s) did not 
enable us to do this in a convincing way. The basic issue is that there are many indicators underlying the running 
variable (8 before 2000 and 9 afterwards) and these could be combined in a huge number of non-linear 
combinations. In addition, there are multiple NGE levels, so we are not just looking along the eligibility/non-
ineligibility boundary, but also at different levels of NGE. The only aspect of the rules where we could identify 
a clear difference was by using ex ante information for the cut-off for GDP per capita (see below). Here we were 
able to implement an RD design in levels, and although the results are qualitatively similar to our main results 
they are noisy. 
We also considered applying spatial discontinuity methods as first used in the paper by Dell (2010). 
Here the running variable is a function of geography (such as latitude and longitude). Unlike our context, 
however, the cut-off is known (it’s when you cross the boundary) and the number of dimensions underlying the 
running variable is smaller (two compared to 8 or 9).  
 
F.4 An RD Design in levels using a known cut-off for one of the elements of RSA rules  
 
While we know which area level statistics have been used to determine if an area is eligible for treatment, we do 
not know the exact threshold(s) that were used to classify areas. One exception is the GDP per capita relative to 
the EU wide average criteria. Only areas with a relative per capita GDP of below 75% are eligible for the 
maximum amount of support (“Tier 1” status).  
We consider using this threshold to generate a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. Note that 
in our main results we exploit many other criteria for eligibility that are based on the ward level. The 75% 
threshold, by contrast is based on the NUTS2 level of aggregation. There are over 10,000 wards but only 34 
NUTS2 levels in Great Britain, which severely reduces the variation in the source of identification. Furthermore, 
only four NUTS2 areas are below the 75% over the 1997 to 2004 period.  
This caveat notwithstanding Online Appendix Table A9 details the RD results. We estimate  𝑙𝑛𝑌 =
𝛽1𝐷 + 𝛽2(𝑅 − 75) + 𝛽3 [𝐷 × (𝑅 − 75)] + 𝜖𝑅𝐹  where R is the running variable (i.e. GDP per capital relative to 
EU average of the NUTS 2 region), D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an area’s running variable is below 75% 
and 𝜖𝑅𝐹 is the error term. Similarly, our IV estimates are 𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝛽1,𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽2,𝑁𝐺𝐸(𝑅 − 75) + 𝛽3,𝑁𝐺𝐸  [𝐷 ∗
(𝑅 − 75)] + 𝜖𝑁𝐺𝐸 where we instrument NGE by D. 
In column (1) of Online Appendix Table A9 the dependent variable is simply the value of NGE. The 
coefficient on the threshold in this “first stage” is positive and significant, suggesting a 9 percentage point 
increase in NGE from crossing the threshold. This is consistent with an increased level of NGE from 18% to 
27% when crossing the threshold on average. In column (2) we present the reduced form for employment and in 
column (3) we present the IV result. In both cases the effect of the policy appears to be positive. Similarly, both 
reduced form and IV for unemployment (columns (4) and (5)) suggest that the policy reduces unemployment. 
Using the IV estimates a 10 percentage point in NGE causes a 19% increase in employment and a 14% 
reduction in unemployment. These are larger than our main estimates in the text. 
Although these implied effects are larger than our baseline estimates, they are very imprecisely 
estimated: neither is significant at conventional levels. This is unsurprising given the fuzziness of the design: the 
corresponding F-statistic on the first stage is only 7.3. The fuzziness of the RD design can also be seen in Online 
Appendix Figure A2. The break at the threshold is hard to see clearly due to the small number of observations. It 
is most visible for the NGE first stage but is much noisier for the labor market outcomes. 
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We also looked at empirically identifying cut-offs for all other variables in Online Appendix A2 that 
made up the policy rules as well as combinations of them. Although sometimes thresholds could be seen in the 
data for NGE and these policy variables (like GDP per capita), they were quite noisy. When using these 
thresholds in a RD Design like that for GDP per capita, we generally found that the point estimates suggested 
improved labor market outcomes, but with statistically insignificant effects (like Online Appendix Table A9).  
Hence, although it is reassuring that the RD design delivers point estimates that are not very different 
from our main results, they are imprecise. Our baseline IV approach that use the other criteria does help us 
obtain more precision in the results albeit at the expense of a more parametric specification. 
 
 
F.5 Other General Robustness tests: GE effects; longer time-period and matching 
 
We have conducted many other robustness tests, especially on the core baseline results of Table 4.  
First, we look to see if there are general equilibrium effects on wages by using average ln(wages) as an 
outcome variable in equivalent specifications to Tables 4 and 6. As argued in subsection II.C it is unlikely that 
there are substantive GE effects from the RSA policy given the magnitude of the sums spent and the nature of 
the policy. As expected, we never found significant effects (e.g. in the equivalent of column (4), Panel A of 
Table 4 NGE has a coefficient of 0.287 with a standard error of 0.877). Although the RSA policy also has no 
significant effect on wages in Table 6, we did find evidence of some equilibrium effects of SF. In the equivalent 
of column (5) of Table 6 SF has a coefficient (standard error) of 0.933(0.333). So, there may be some impact of 
this wider policy, even though we have shown it does not confound the RSA impact we identify. 
Second, we estimated the regressions over a longer time-period (from 1986 to 2004) which includes the 
policy change in 1993 as well as the one we use in 2000. Unfortunately, detailed information on the construction 
of the policy rules for the period before 1993 is not available so we cannot construct the rule change 
instruments. Hence, we only run regressions of outcome variables on actual NGE support levels.
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 As noted 
above, data on unemployment and non-manufacturing employment is not available on a consistent basis pre-
1997 (and even the manufacturing series has some concerns in these earlier years). Nevertheless, putting these 
concerns aside, we find coefficients implying that an increase of support intensity by 10 percentage points leads 
to a growth of 2.8% more jobs (see Online Appendix Table A11, column (2)). This is somewhat higher, but not 
significantly different from the results in column (1) which just uses the 1997-2004 period. 
Third, we examined trimming the sample on a common support; i.e. we exclude observations that fall 
into the extremes of the distribution of employment and unemployment across wards. We successively drop 
larger bands from the edges of the distribution (1%, 5%, and 10%). None of this has much effect on the 
estimates (see last six columns of Online Appendix Table A11). 
 
 
APPENDIX G: RSA COSTS PER JOB AND A COMPARISON WITH OTHER 
ESTIMATES IN THE LITERATURE 
 
G.1 Calculating additional jobs in our study 
 
We work out the cost per job by looking at the reduction in jobs that would arise if, instead of redrawing the 
map in 2000, the government had abolished the policy, i.e. had set NGE to zero in all areas. Note that while our 
model is specified using logs of employment we cannot use the approximation that the resulting estimates 
represent percentage changes because this only holds for relatively small changes. However, in our case we 
have changes in NGE which can be up to 35%. Hence, we calculate counterfactual employment levels when 
support is withdrawn in an area r as: 
 
ln 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟
𝐶𝐹 = ln𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟 − ?̂?1𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟 
 
Where 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟
𝐶𝐹 is the counterfactual employment level in the absence of the policy, EMPr is the current level 
of employment and 𝛽 is the estimated coefficient on NGE. Consequently, the reduction in jobs in area r 
becomes  
 
                                                 
22
 Another limitation is that there is no consistent series of ward level unemployment for the period before 1996 
so we just focus on employment.   
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∆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟
𝐶𝐹 ≡ 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟
𝐶𝐹 − 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟 = (
1
exp(?̂?𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑟)
− 1)𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟 
 
We calculate this counterfactual employment for each area using the area average level of employment from 
2000-2004 (to smooth out any yearly variation) and the area level of NGE pre-2000.  
In the main text, we do this calculation using the area level IV coefficient of 0.953. Using this 
coefficient we estimate that 156,000 jobs would have been lost if the policy had been abolished in 2000. With 
costs of £288 million, calculated as reported in the text, this gives us a cost per job of £1,846. Taking the more 
conservative OLS coefficients of 0.124 we get smaller job effects of just under 22,400 and a correspondingly 
higher cost per job of £12,857, again as reported in the text. 
For the purposes of comparing to other studies, it is also useful to have an estimate from the firm level 
regressions. As the effect on large firms is insignificant from zero, we use the IV coefficient for small firms of 
0.441 and calculate as before, but now using area level employment in supported small firms as the basis for the 
area level calculation. This gives an estimate of 20,790 jobs and a cost per job of £13,852. 
 
 
G.2 Comparing the magnitude of our effects with other Place-Based Policies 
 
We provide information on several other cost-per job estimates that have been published for similar area-based 
policies. To identify these studies, we started with the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2016a, 
b) reviews which report results from a systematic review of the evaluation evidence. Systematic search terms 
were developed and applied on multiple platforms covering published research, working papers and government 
reports (e.g. EconPapers, Google Scholar, Gov.co.uk and OECD.org). The results were sifted based on 
relevance (area-based policy evaluations, OECD focus, and English language reports) and robustness of method 
according to the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (Sherman et al. 1998). The What Works Centre uses a 
methodological cut-off point which requires a before and after comparison for treated and a suitable control 
group.
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 The review reports that the initial search found more than 2,100 policy evaluations and that sifting left 
58 evaluations that met this minimum criterion. From these, we took the three studies that provided cost per job 
estimates.   
We supplemented these three studies with additional cost per job estimates from more recently 
published evaluations of area-based policies identified using additional searches on Google Scholar. These 
additional searches mainly focused on identifying evaluations of area-based policies (although we also included 
one study that provided loans rather than grants to small businesses) published in the leading peer reviewed 
journals and other journals in the relevant field (which we judged to be “Urban Economics” given the nature of 
the intervention).  
Ultimately, we found six cost-per job estimates for area-based policies that are reported in Online 
Appendix Table A21 (these are drawn from eight separate papers and we include our own estimates in this 
paper for comparison). We report the name of the program (column (1)), the country where the program was 
implemented (column (2)), a brief description of the intervention (column (3)), the econometric methodology 
(column (4)), the unit of analysis (column (5)), the cost per job estimate (column (6)) in 2010 US$, and the 
source articles (column (7)). We converted to US dollars using the original currency to dollar exchange rate in 
the price base year for reported costs. For example, if program costs were originally reported in £2003, then the 
£-$ exchange rate for 2003 would have been used. Historical yearly average exchange rates were taken from 
www.ofx.com. Finally, we adjusted to 2010 constant prices using a consumer price index for the US taken from 
the World Bank at https://data.worldbank.org/.  
This exercise also identified several studies which provided less direct estimates of the cost per job – 
either modelling these from evaluations for other outputs (e.g. productivity), undertaking calculations using 
additional ad-hoc assumptions (e.g. imposing additionality or multiplier assumptions), or reporting ex-ante 
appraisal estimates. Figures for these studies are available on request. The range of costs is similar to those 
reported in Online Appendix Table A21. 
Our own cost per job estimates of RSA in row 1 of Online Appendix Table A21 of $3,541 looks much 
lower than those reported in the other studies. Two methodological differences help explain our lower cost per 
job numbers. First, two of the three area-based studies reported in rows 4 and 5 use OLS rather than IV. If we 
use our OLS coefficients we derive a cost per job of $24,662 (reported in row 2), which is within the range of 
these two studies ($18,295 and $63,100).  
Second, results for the three firm-based studies (rows 7 through 9 of Online Appendix Table A21) 
should be based on cost per job estimates derived using coefficients from our firm-level regressions. Here, we 
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 In practice, this means any study that uses an identification strategy based on a minimum Conditional 
Independence Assumption on observables such as propensity score matching or regression. 
16 
 
need to account for the fact that the effect of RSA on large firms is zero. Doing this by using data on small firms 
and the coefficient from the small firm only regressions gives a cost per job of $26,572 (row 3). This is higher 
than the US figure (row 7), but lower than the two Italian studies (rows 8 and 9). This suggest that ignoring (in 
our case positive) area level multipliers over-estimates the cost per job. It is also important to restrict job 
calculations to those firms for whom estimated effects are positive (in our case, small firms). 
The comparisons in Online Appendix Table A21 highlight two ways in which our cost per job 
estimates improve on existing studies. But it is also important to note that aspects of RSA policy design also 
help explain some of the differences that persist even after making these methodological adjustments. RSA is 
selective and targeted at manufacturing firms who can provide evidence that they require support and that they 
do not serve just the local geographical market. By contrast, most of the area-based policies in Online Appendix 
Table A19 are non-selective providing support to all firms within the target area regardless of whether they can 
provide evidence that the subsidies are likely to create additional jobs. To the extent that RSA procedures better 
identify firms generating additionality we would expect less deadweight for RSA than for these other non-
selective schemes (see the model discussion in Section II in the main text).  
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Figure A1: Distribution of the level of the policy rule instrumental variable 
Panel A: Level of the instrument 
 
Panel B: Change in the value of the instrumental variable 
 
Notes: Histograms of the policy rule instrument based on 10,737 wards. Panel B is 
,r tz  which is the actual IV 
used and Panel A is 
,r tz  constructed from the expected probability of being in each subsidy regime multiplied 
by the level of subsidy in that regime. It is constructed form the ordered probits in Table 3 from which we can 
calculate the probability that an area falls into a subsidy regime in all years and the actual level of NGE. See 
Appendix B for further details. 
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Figure A2: Regression discontinuity at 75% GDP per capita relative to EU average 
threshold 
NGE 
 
ln(Employment/Population) 
 
Ln(Unemployment/Population) 
 
 
 
Notes: The running variable on the horizontal axis is GDP per capita of the NUTS2 area 
relative to the EU wide average level. The diamonds show the mean value (across wards) of 
the dependent variable at a particular value of the running variable. Shaded areas are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure A3: Alternative approaches to spatial clustering 
Immediate neighbors 
 
Close Neighbors 
 
Notes: The Figure illustrates our two spatial clustering approaches based on similar support levels in 
neighboring clusters. The colored areas show common clusters based on the same support level in both the pre 
and post 2000 period for neighboring areas (wards). Non-treated wards are grouped based on NUTS2 areas 
shown in white. On the left, neighboring is defined as two wards having a common contiguous border leading to 
70 treated and 32 non-treated clusters. On the right, neighboring it is defined as being no further than 1km away 
leading to 48 treated and 32 non-treated clusters. The corresponding regression results are reported in Online 
Appendix Table A20 Panels B and C, respectively. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics across areas (Wards), Manufacturing 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Aggregate 
expenditure 
on RSA 
(£m) 
Average 
NGE 
(maximum 
investment 
subsidy)  
rate in 
eligible 
wards 
Eligible 
Wards (as 
% of all 
Wards) 
Jobs in 
eligible 
areas 
(millions) 
Plants in 
Eligible 
Areas 
Jobs in 
eligible 
areas (as 
% of all 
jobs) 
% plants 
in eligible 
areas 
% plants 
in eligible 
areas 
receiving 
support 
1997 158.27 0.241 31.9 1.230 44,755 42.1 32.4            4.4 
1998 115.32 0.241 31.9 1.211 43,575 41.9 32.3 3.1 
1999 91.76 0.241 31.9 1.168 43,101 41.7 32.3 2.8 
2000 185.68 0.237 26.1 1.041 36,557 38.6  28.0 3.4 
2001 219.69 0.237 26.1 1.002 35,837 37.9 28.0 3.1 
2002 192.71 0.237 26.1 0.939 35,274 37.6 28.0 3.0 
2003 197.26 0.237 26.1 0.900 34,797 37.7 28.1 3.1 
2004 148.58 0.237 26.1 0.866 34,437 37.9 28.0 3.0 
Average 163.66 0.238 28.3 1.045 38,542 39.4 29.6 3.1 
 
Notes: Column (1) is total expenditure on RSA. Column (2) is the average NGE across eligible wards. Column 
(3) is the share of wards that are eligible for RSA. Column (4) are the number of jobs in eligible areas. Column 
(5) is the number of plants in eligible areas. Column (6) reports the jobs in eligible areas as a fraction of all jobs. 
Column (7) reports the plants in eligible areas as a fraction of all plants. Column (8) is the fraction of plants in 
eligible areas that receive support. All data refer to manufacturing sector. 
 
Source: Industrial Development Reports (various years) and authors’ calculation using the IDBR, ARD and 
SAMIS matched data. 
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Table A2 - Variables that define Rules for eligibility 
Variable 
 
Definition Timing of data 
used by EU for 
eligibility 
 
Source 
 
 
 
 
Used in which 
years for rules 
GDP per capita 
 
Value added in the area per person 
(NUTS2) 
1991 (for 1993);  
1994-96 average 
(for 2000) 
Eurostat 1993 and  
2000 
Population Density  
 
Number of inhabitants per square 
km (district) 
1981 (for 1993) 
1991 (for 2000) 
Census 
 
1993 and 2000  
Share of high 
Skilled workers  
 
 
Share of working residents aged 
over 16 in high skilled (SOC 
Groups 1 to 3) occupation (ward) 
1991 (for both) 
 
 
 
Census 
 
 
 
1993 and 2000 
Start-Up rate 
 
 
Annualized net percentage rate of 
growth of company VAT 
registrations (except retail and 
agriculture); i.e. total registrations 
minus de-registrations (district) 
1987-1991  
 
 
 
 
ONS Business 
Register 
 
 
1993  
Structural 
Unemployment rate  
Average annual unemployment 
(based on ILO definition) rate 5-
year average (district) 
1986-90 (for 1993); 
1992-96 (for 2000) 
 
 
ONS  
 
 
1993 and 2000 
Activity rate  
 
 
 
Fraction of working age population 
who are economically active. For 
men: 16-64; for women: 16-59. 
(ward) 
1991 (for both) 
 
 
 
Census 
 
 
 
1993 and 2000 
 
Employment Rate  
 
 
Residents in employment divided 
by population of working age 
(district) 
1992 
 
 
Labor Force Survey 2000 
Current 
Unemployment rate 
(Claimant Count) 
Average monthly unemployment 
rate over year. Based on residents 
claiming unemployment insurance 
divided by labor force (district) 
1991 (for 1993);  
1998 (for 2000) 
 
ONS 
 
 
1993 and 2000 
ILO Unemployment 
Rate  
Proportion of residential labor 
force who are “ILO” unemployed 
(district) 
1992 
 
 
Labor Force Survey 2000 
Long-duration 
Unemployment rate  
Number claiming unemployed 
insurance for more than a year as a 
fraction of the labor force (ward) 
1991 
 
 
 
Census 
 
 
 
1993 
Share of 
manufacturing 
workers 
Number of manufacturing 
employee jobs divided by total jobs 
(ward) 
1991 
 
 
Census 
 
 
2000 
Notes: These are the definitions of variables used by the EU to determine whether an area is eligible for RSA and if so, at what level 
of support. The definitions column also gives the level of aggregation that the data is defined at (in parentheses). ILO unemployed 
are defined as individuals who are (i) without a job, want a job, have actively sought work in the last four weeks and are available to 
start work in the next two weeks, or (ii) are out of work, have found a job and are waiting to start it in the next two weeks. People 
who are not claimants can appear among ILO unemployed if they are not entitled to unemployment related benefits. Similarly, 
unemployment claimants may not appear in the LFS measure of unemployment if they state that they are not seeking, or are not 
available, to start work. The average district in our data contains 25 wards and the average NUT2 contains 15 districts. 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities (1998), OJ C 74, 10.3; and OJ C 88/C 212/02, 12.8.1988; 
Department of Trade and Industry (1999) “The UK Government’s proposals for new Objective 2 areas” Official letter 
SG(2000) D/ 106293; Department of Trade and Industry (1993), “Review of the assisted areas of Great Britain. Background 
document on the new assisted areas map.”  
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Table A3: Changes in area eligibility for Structural Funds (SF) and RSA before and after 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Total 
Eligible for RSA and 
eligible for SF in 2000 
onwards 
Eligible for RSA and 
not eligible for SF 2000 
onwards 
Non-eligible for RSA 
and eligible for SF 2000 
onwards 
Non-eligible for RSA 
and non-eligible for SF 
2000 onwards  
1. Eligible for RSA 
and eligible for 
SF in 1993-99 
2,424 
(22.58% of total wards) 
1,743 0 681 0 
 % of row 100% 71.91% 0.00% 28.09% 0.00% 
2. Eligible for RSA 
and not eligible 
for SF in 1993-99 
1,004 
(9.35% of total wards) 
384 195 0 425 
  % of row 100% 38.25% 19.42% 0.00% 42.33% 
3. Non-eligible for 
RSA and eligible 
for SF in 1993-99 
703 
(6.55% of total wards) 
175 0 528 0 
  % of row 100% 24.89% 0.00% 75.11% 0.00% 
4. Non-eligible for 
RSA and non-
eligible for SF in 
1993-99 
6,606 
(61.53% of total wards) 
177 134 0 6,295 
  % of row 100% 2.68% 2.03% 0.00% 95.29% 
Total 10,737 2,479 329 1,209 6,720 
Notes: This is the transition matrix showing numbers of wards before and after the policy change in 2000 (for RSA and SF). For example, column (1) of the first row details 
that there were 2,424 areas eligible for both RSA and SF pre-2000 (22.58% of total wards as noted in parentheses below the figure). The next 4 rows show how these rows 
transitioned into different RSA and SF regimes. For example, column (2) shows 1,743 (71.91%) remained eligible for both RSA and SF after 2000 whereas column (4) shows 
681 (28.09%) lost access to RSA but not SF. 
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Table A4: Estimates of parameters on eligibility rule changes for Structural Fund (SF) IV 
 
 Year 1993 2000 
Dependent Variable: Eligibility for Structural Funds 
GDP per capita  -0.046 -0.057 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Population density  -0.029 -0.046 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Share of high skilled workers -0.501 -0.406 
 (0.149) (0.155) 
Employment rate -2.955 -6.703 
 (0.376) (0.524) 
Current unemployment rate  33.835 52.296 
(claimant count) (2.479) (2.600) 
ILO unemployment  rate  4.274 0.162 
 (0.793) (0.912) 
Share of manufacturing workers  3.028 2.127 
 
(0.215) (0.218) 
Robberies 263.371 265.231 
 (19.781) (21.382) 
Drug Crimes -87.770 12.598 
 (6.250) (2.013) 
Burglaries 35.245 7.093 
 (0.046) (0.057) 
Log Likelihood -4,261.914 -3,900.468 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. The table reports the regressions we perform to derive instruments for structural fund eligibility of an 
area. For that we regress in column (1) a dummy indicating structural fund eligibility pre-2000 on various area level statistics evaluated before 1993. The second column 
performs the same regression on a dummy indicating SF eligibility post-2000 (with the same control variables). Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are 
clustered at the area (ward) level.    
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Table A5: Controlling for Other policies – Unemployment as an outcome 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Ln(Unemployment)  
A. Reduced Form      
Rule change IV -0.336 -0.367 -0.363 -0.399 -0.350 -0.346 -0.292 -0.253 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) 
Employment 
Zones 
-0.017      -0.032 -0.028 
 (0.008)      (0.008) (0.008) 
Coalfield  -0.009     0.004 0.004 
Regeneration 
Trust 
 (0.006)     (0.006) (0.006) 
Regional Venture    0.036    0.041 0.039 
Capital Funds   (0.008)    (0.008) (0.008) 
Enterprise Grants    -0.066   -0.053 -0.050 
    (0.006)   (0.007) (0.007) 
New Deal for      0.025  0.050 0.045 
Communities     (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Devolution to      0.068 0.062 0.073 
Wales and 
Scotland 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Structural Fund         -0.108 
IV        (0.023) 
B. IV      
NGE -0.407 -0.420 -0.413 -0.463 -0.394 -0.388 -0.346 -0.234 
 (0.084) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.082) (0.096) 
Employment 
Zones 
-0.004      -0.024 -0.016 
 (0.009)      (0.009) (0.009) 
Coalfield  -0.019     -0.002 -0.001 
Regeneration 
Trust 
 (0.006)     (0.006) (0.006) 
Regional Venture    0.031    0.038 0.036 
Capital Funds   (0.008)    (0.008) (0.008) 
Enterprise Grants    -0.083   -0.062 -0.064 
    (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007) 
New Deal for      0.031  0.058 0.054 
Communities     (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Devolution to      0.086 0.074 0.077 
Wales and 
Scotland 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Structural Fund        -0.087 
        (0.026) 
Number of areas 
(wards) 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
10,737 
 
 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896  
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. This is the same specification as Table 7 
except with ln(unemployment) instead of ln(manufacturing employment) as the dependent variable. Standard 
errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the area (ward) level.  NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) 
is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. The time-period is 1997-2004. Rule Change IV is 
described in text. Panel A has a specification identical to column (2) in Panel A of Table 4 except additional 
policy variables have been included (see text). Panel B has a specification identical to column (4) in Panel A of 
Table 4 except additional policy variables have been included (see text). 
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Table A6: Alternative ways of controlling for initial conditions in area regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method  OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment); No initial lagged values 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.218   1.140 
NGE (0.071)   (0.244) 
Policy Rule Instrument  1.007 0.883  
  (0.215) (0.032)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment); No initial lagged values 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.226   -0.583 
NGE (0.025)   (0.076) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.515 0.883  
  (0.067) (0.032)  
C. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment); Second order polynomial in all lagged 
characteristics  
Maximum investment subsidy 0.095   1.110 
NGE (0.071)   (0.247) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.930 0.837  
  (0.204) (0.034)  
D. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment); Second order polynomial in all lagged characteristics 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.139   -0.671 
NGE (0.024)   (0.079) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.562 0.837  
  (0.064) (0.034)  
E. Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment); Including predicted probabilities  
Maximum investment subsidy 0.139   0.887 
NGE (0.070)   (0.256) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.786 0.886  
  (0.227) (0.033)  
F. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment); Including predicted probabilities 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.127   -0.334 
NGE (0.024)   (0.078) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.296 0.886  
  (0.069) (0.033)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) 
are clustered at the area (ward) level.  NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the 
area. The time-period is 1997-2004. These specifications are the same as Table 4 except instead of including lagged linear 
controls used to define eligibility in 1993 (
,93rX
), Panels A and B exclude them, while Panels C and D include both linear 
controls and a second order polynomial in these terms (all cross products and quadratic terms). Panels E and F include the 
predicted probabilities of receiving a particular level of support as additional controls. These are derived from the 
multinomial regression of support level state on long lagged area level statistics, which we use to construct our instruments. 
(Table 3 columns (1) and (2)). 
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Table A7: Area Level regressions – Placebo regressions 1995-1999 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: ln(employment)   
Specification Baseline: 2000 Placebo: 1997 
Years 1997-2004 1995-1999 
   
Policy Rule Instrument 0.839 0.162 
  (0.228) (0.163) 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 53,685 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Column (1) is the same specification as the reduced 
form employment equation of Table 4 Panel A using the baseline in 2000 when actual policy rule change took place.  The 
placebo in column (2) uses employment changes as if the policy change happened in 1997 in column (2).  
 
 
 
Table A8: Area level - Bootstrapped standard errors to account for generated 
regressors 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Employment) Ln(Unemployment) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.839 -0.365 
 
(0.215) (0.072) 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. The standard errors in most of our tables ignore the 
fact that our policy rule instrument emerges after regressing support status on various area level statistics taken into account 
by EU rules; i.e. as reported in Table 3. Here we provide bootstrapped results (clustered at the ward level, 200 replications). 
This shows standard errors very similar to those simpler ones found in column (2) of Table 4. 
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Table A9: Regression Discontinuity Design approach using only GDP per capita policy variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable NGE ln(Employment) Ln(Unemployment) 
 
First Stage Reduced Form IV Reduced Form IV 
D (Threshold) 0.091 0.161  -0.119  
 (0.034) (0.188)  (0.161)  
NGE   1.7665  -1.299 
 
  (2.339)  (1.962) 
Running variable -0.017 0.064 0.094 -0.082 -0.104 
 
(0.005) (0.021) (0.060) (0.018) (0.05) 
Running  0.006 -0.084 -0.095 0.092 0.100 
Variable Threshold (0.006) (0.024) (0.037) (0.020) (0.032) 
      
Observations 27,562 27,562 27,562 27,562 27,562 
Wards 4,079 4,079 4,079 4,079 4,079 
# of NUTS2 clusters 14 14 14 14 14 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Coefficients are from OLS regressions, with standard errors below clustered by NUTS2. An 
observation is a ward-year. All regressions include ln(population in the ward).  Bandwidth is (wards in) NUTS2 areas between 60% to 95% GDP per capita of EU average. 
See text for exact specifications. The dependent variables in columns (2) through (4) are normalized on area population. 
 
Table A10: Alternative RD Design 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Employment Unemployment 
Maximum investment subsidy (NGE) 0.160 -0.210 
 (0.070) (0.024) 
Area statistics defining support eligibility pre-2000 Yes Yes 
Area statistics defining support eligibility post-2000 Yes Yes 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Coefficients are from OLS regressions, with standard errors below clustered by ward.  NGE (“Net 
Grant Equivalent”) is the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. All columns include a full set of linear (lagged) characteristics used to define eligibility in the 
pre and post-2000 period. The time-period is 1997-2004. Dependent variables are in differences of relative to the base year of 1997.   
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Table A11: Robustness of Ward Level regressions – Long time horizon (1986-2004) and Common Support 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Var: ln(Employment) Ln(Employment) Ln(Unemployment) 
Years 1997-2004 1986-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 
Trimming: None None 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
NGE 0.169 0.280       
 
(0.057) (0.071)       
Rules Change IV   0.895 0.856 0.958 -0.419 -0.322 -0.313 
   (0.234) (0.269) (0.303) (0.068) (0.073) (0.079) 
         
         
# of areas(wards) 10,737 10,737 10,322 8,755 6,985 10,322 8,755 6,985 
Observations 85,896 204,003 82,576 70,040 55,880 82,576 70,040 55,880 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Each cell is from a different regression and each of the eight panels is a different sample and measure of 
the treatment effect. Columns (1) and (2) are by OLS (as we do not know pre-1993 policy rules to construct IVs) and include a full set of area fixed effects and time dummies 
(so within groups rather than the standard long-differences regressions as it is unclear which year to use as baseline). Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area 
(ward level) in all columns. The time-period is 1986-2004 in columns (1) and (2) and 1997-2004 in the other columns. NGE is maximum investment grant subsidy. Columns 
(3)-(8) trim the sample to get a closer common support and re-run the reduced form of Table 3 Panel A column (2). “1%” trims the sample at the lowest and top percentiles, 
“2%” trims from 2nd to 98th percentile, etc. 
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Table A12: Alternative Firm Size cut-offs, Plant-level employment regressions  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
Panel A. Small Firm employment less than 40 in 1996 (583,259 observations; 86,109 firms; 9,874 
areas) 
NGE -0.002   0.429 
 (0.027)   (0.096) 
Policy Rule   0.292 0.680  
Instrument  (0.064) (0.040)  
Panel B. Large Firm employment greater than 40 in 1996 (70,126 observations; 10,659 firms; 
4,008 areas) 
NGE 0.065   0.200 
 
(0.052)   (0.191) 
Policy Rule   0.126 0.629  
instrument  (0.120) (0.052)  
Panel C. Small Firm employment less than 60 in 1996 ( 601,976 observations; 88,837 firms  
9,893 areas) 
NGE 0.004   0.431 
 
(0.026)   (0.094) 
Policy Rule   0.292 0.679  
instrument  (0.062) (0.040)  
Panel D. Large Firm employment greater than 60 in 1996 (51,409 observations; 7,931 firms; 
3,466  areas) 
NGE 0.055   0.174 
 
(0.059)   (0.221) 
Policy Rule   0.11 0.632  
Instrument  (0.140) (0.052)  
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses below 
coefficients) are clustered at the area (ward) level.  These are all plant-level regressions splitting the samples by 
firm size in 1996 (or the year the plant enters the sample). Each cell is from a different regression. All columns 
include a full set of area fixed effects time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area 
(ward level) in all columns. The time-period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. 
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Table A13: Do small firms respond to treatment more because they are younger?  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: ln(employment)      
Young = Alive for no more than:  3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 
NGE 0.034 0.043 0.067 0.047 0.071 
 
(0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.187) 
NGE × Small Firm 0.407 0.408 0.430 0.429 0.442 
 
(0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) (0.202) 
NGE × Young firms  -0.187 -0.396 -0.108 -0.162 
  (0.315) (0.225) (0.170) (0.160) 
      
Observations 653,385 653,385 653,385 653,385 653,385 
Firms 96,768 96,768 96,768 96,768 96,768 
Number of Areas (wards) 9,975 9,975 9,975 9,975 9,975 
      
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. These are specifications equivalent to 
Table 10 Panel A column (4) except that we include additional interactions as specified. Column (1) includes an 
interaction with “small” - defined as firms with less than 50 employees (as in Table 10) only. Columns (2) to (5) 
are based on different definitions of a “young” firm. Column (2) defines young to be a firm that is one year old 
or younger; in column (3) young = 2 years old or less, etc. All treatment variables are instrumented using the 
equivalent interactions between the policy rule instrument and the respective indicators for “small” and 
“young”.  
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Table A14: Is absence of policy effect on plants in large firms because they 
receive less subsidies?  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Method OLS First Stage IV 
Sample: Pooled across all plants, 653,385 observations on 96,768 plants, 9,975  wards  
A. Pooled, Dummy for subsidy receipt 
Receiving any subsidy? -0.004  1.658 
RSA>0 (0.011)  (0.464) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.188  
  (0.040)  
B. Pooled, subsidy amount    
ln(subsidy) 0.001  0.276 
RSA  (0.001)  (0.112) 
Policy Rule Instrument  1.132  
  (0.418)  
Sample: Small (Plants in Firm with under 50 employees) 594,356 observations on 87,728 plants, 
9,880 wards  
C. Small, Dummy for subsidy receipt 
Receiving any subsidy? -0.02  1.891 
RSA>0 (0.013)  (0.607) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.158  
  (0.037)  
D. Small, subsidy amount 
Ln(subsidy) 0.000  0.329 
RSA  (0.001)  (0.160) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.908  
  (0.401)  
Sample: Large (Plants in Firm with over 50 employees), 59,029 observations on 9,040 plants, 
3,708 wards  
E. Large, Dummy for subsidy receipt 
Receiving any subsidy? 0.022  0.120 
RSA>0 (0.018)  (0.345) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.375  
  (0.139)  
F. Large, subsidy amount    
ln(subsidy) 0.002  0.019 
RSA  (0.002)  (0.055) 
Policy Rule Instrument  2.384  
  (1.569)  
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. Each cell is from a different regression 
and each of the six panels is a different sample and measure of the treatment effect. Standard errors below 
coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time-period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule 
instrument is described in text. “Receiving any subsidy” (RSA>0) is a dummy switched on when the firm 
begins receiving an investment subsidy and ln(subsidy), RSA, is the log of (1+the amount of subsidy received). 
All columns include a full set of long memory area statistics. All variables are in differences of ln(1+Y) relative 
to the base year 1997, where Y is the raw value of the variable. 
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Table A15: RSA Impact in large vs small firms 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Average 
Subsidy 
amount 
(£1,000s) 
Average 
number of 
employees 
Elasticity 
between 
employment 
and subsidies 
Marginal 
Impact of 
subsidy 
Small Firm (under 50) 29.45 18 0.329 0.201 
Large Firm (over 50) 107.19 211 0.012 0.024 
Notes: The Table calculates the marginal effect of £1,000 of subsidy on the number of jobs, split by large and 
small firms. Column (1) is the average subsidy received and column (2) is the average plant size from our data 
1997-99. In column (3) we report the elasticity between jobs and subsidies received (  ) as estimated in 
column (3) of Online Appendix Table A14 for small firms (Panel D) and large firms (Panel F). Since 
lnL
ln





 where L = employment and  = subsidy, the marginal effect of a $ of subsidy on the number of 
jobs is: 
L L

 



. This is given in column (4). It shows that the marginal impact of subsidies on jobs is over 
eight times (= 0.201/0.024) bigger in plants belonging to small firms rather than large firms. 
 
 
 
Table A16: Alternative ways of measuring firm-level productivity  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Method of measuring TFP: Factor Share Regression MU OMEGA 
Policy Rule instrument -0.034 -0.017 0.336 
 
(0.043) (0.065) (3.206) 
   
Observations 45,511 45,511 18,999 
Firms 21,389 21,389 9,139 
 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. These are reduced form specifications 
corresponding to column (2) of Panel E in Table 11. “Factor Share” method in column (1) reproduces the results 
reported in Panel E of Table 11 for reference; i.e. TFP is computed using a “factor share” method and relative to 
an industry by year average “Regression” method in column (2) includes (the log of) labor, materials and capital 
as additional control variables in a specification where the dependent variable is ln(revenue). “MU OMEGA” in 
column (3) implements the structural production function framework proposed in Martin (2012) which takes 
into account firm specific variation in market power when computing TFP. The exact method of construction is 
in the final subsection of Appendix C. 
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Table A17: Firm level regressions with capital intensity interactions  
 
 Dependent variable: ln(employment)     
Policy Rule Instrument 0.519 0.247 
 
(0.112) (0.137) 
Policy Rule Instrument × High Capital Intensity  0.525 
 
 (0.200) 
Observations 72,902 72,902 
Firms 12,242 12,242 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. These are specifications equivalent to 
column (2) of Table 11 Panel B.  Standard errors (in parentheses below coefficients) are clustered at the area 
(ward) level.  Capital intensity is firm level average capital to labor ratio before 2000. “High capital intensity” is 
a dummy equal to one if capital intensity is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Sample is smaller than 
in other firm level results because firms without valid observations for pre-2000 capital intensity are excluded. 
 
 
 
 
Table A18: Instrumenting NGE with Policy Rule Instrument (but using 
linear probability model instead of ordered probit for Table 3)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.124   1.509 
NGE (0.070)   (0.255) 
Policy Rule Instrument  1.266 0.839  
  (0.208) (0.036)  
B. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.137   -0.767 
NGE (0.024)   (0.099) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.644 0.839  
  (0.079) (0.036)  
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Notes:  denotes significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is the level 
of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time 
dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time-period 
is 1997-2004. This Table corresponds to Table 4, however, we use a slightly different version of the policy rule 
instrument. Instead of the ordered probit reported in Table 3, the instrument here is based on a binary Probit of 
the event “NGE>0”.   
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Table A19: Other policies (introduced between 1997 and 2004) 
    
Policy Aim When Introduced? Area Eligibility 
New Deal for 
the Long 
Term 
Unemployed  
Helping long-term 
unemployed (over 25 
years old) into work. 
Mandatory work 
search, training or 
wage subsidy. 
July 1999 National 
Employment 
Zones (EZ) 
 
To improve the 
employability of the 
long-term unemployed 
through skill 
acquisition, fast-track 
job services and 
removal of restrictions 
to getting jobs.  
April 2000 In 15 disadvantaged 
areas EZ provision 
replaced New Deal for 
Long-Term 
Unemployed.  
Coalfields 
Regeneration 
Trust 
To support areas 
historically dependent 
on Coalfields. 
1999 Coalfields 
New Deal for 
Communities 
To tackle multiple 
deprivation in the 
poorest areas. 
1998-2008 17 areas 1998-2010; 22 
areas 1999-2011 (10 in 
London and others 
throughout England).  
9,900 people per area 
on average 
New Deal for 
18 - 24 year 
old 
unemployed 
people 
To help young 
unemployed people 
find work. Mandatory 
work search, training or 
wage subsidy. 
July 1999 National   
New deal for 
Lone Parents 
To encourage lone 
parents into work. 
April 1998  National  
 
New Deal for 
Partners of 
Unemployed 
People 
To give unemployed 
partners of unemployed 
access to employment 
programs. 
April 1999 National 
New Deal for 
Disabled 
People 
Helping people off 
disability benefit and 
into work  
July 2001 National  
 35 
Job Centre 
Plus 
Merged services of 
working age welfare 
and unemployment 
benefits. Increased IT 
spending and 
incentives for public 
sector workers. Aim of 
getting more benefit 
claimants into work. 
April 2002 National  
Phoenix Fund To encourage 
entrepreneurship in 
disadvantaged areas. 
1999 National 
Enterprise 
Fund 
To give entrepreneurs 
access to finance by 
creating a £180m fund 
for debt and equity 
finance to SMEs with 
growth potential (e.g. 
UK High Technology 
growth fund 
specialized in fund of 
fund investments in 
venture capital). 
December 1998   National 
Regional 
Venture 
Capital Funds  
Provision of small scale 
equity (under 
£500,000) to firms with 
growth potential.  
West Midlands and 
East of England from 
2002 
All England from 2003 
Grant for 
research and 
development  
To provide grants for 
investigating 
innovative ideas and 
knowledge transfer.  
1999 National 
Single 
Regeneration 
Budget 
To support local 
initiatives to make a 
contribution towards 
the area regeneration. 
1994-2002 National  
 
Notes: Details of different policies that could potentially confound the effects of RSA. 
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Table A20: Alternative approaches to spatial correlation 
Panel A: Clusters based on Travel to Work Areas (TTWA); 322 clusters  
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.124   0.953 
NGE (0.080)   (0.279) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.839 0.881  
  (0.238) (0.133)  
 Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.137   -0.414 
NGE (0.052)   (0.198) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.365 0.881  
  (0.180) (0.133)  
Number of Clusters 322 322 322 322 
Panel B: Clusters based on immediate neighbors; 102 clusters 
Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.124   0.953 
NGE (0.082)   (0.330) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.839 0.881  
  (0.259) (0.140)  
Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.137   -0.414 
NGE (0.053)   (0.237) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.365 0.881  
  (0.197) (0.140)  
Number of Clusters 102 102 102 102 
Panel C: Clusters based on close neighbors; 80 clusters 
Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.124   0.953 
NGE (0.081)   (0.343) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.839 0.881  
  (0.275) (0.145)  
Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.137   -0.414 
NGE (0.053)   (0.239) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.365 0.881  
  (0.198) (0.145)  
Number of Clusters 80  80 80 80 
Panel D: Clusters based on NUTS2 regions; 34 clusters 
Dependent variable: ln(Manufacturing Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 0.124   0.953 
NGE (0.087)   (0.458) 
Policy Rule Instrument  0.839 0.881  
  (0.367) (0.188)  
Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy -0.137   -0.414 
NGE (0.058)   (0.278) 
Policy Rule Instrument  -0.365 0.881  
  (0.236) (0.188)  
Number of Clusters 34 34 34 34 
Notes: These are identical regressions to Table 4 (85,896 observations) except we allow the standard errors to 
be clustered at a higher level than the ward. Panel A clusters the standard errors at the Travel to Work Area 
(TTWA) level. Panel B clusters at the “neighboring ward” level defined to be wards that are (i) directly adjacent 
(ii) that receive the same level of support pre and post-2000. Wards not receiving any support are clustered at 
the NUTS2 level. Panel C defines neighboring wards more broadly to be (i) within 1km of each other and (ii) 
receiving the same level of support pre and post 2000. Wards not receiving any support are again clustered at 
the NUTS2 level. Panel D is the most conservative simply clustering at the NUTS2 level.  
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Table A21: Cost per job estimates in RSA compared to others in the literature 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
# Program Country Program Description Method Unit Cost per job  
(2010 USD) 
Source(s) 
1 Regional Selective Assistance UK Investment subsidies to businesses in 
disadvantaged areas. 
IV Area 
(wards) 
3,541 This paper 
2 Regional Selective Assistance UK Investment subsidies to businesses in 
disadvantaged areas. 
DD Area 
(wards) 
24,662 This paper 
3 Regional Selective Assistance UK Investment subsidies to businesses in 
disadvantaged areas. 
IV Small 
Firms 
26,572 This paper 
4 Empowerment Zones US Grants, hiring credits and other benefits for 
businesses in distressed urban areas. 
DD Area 
(tract) 
18,295 Bartik (2010), Busso et al. (2010) 
5 Empowerment Zones US Grants, hiring credits and other benefits for 
businesses in distressed urban areas. 
DD Area 
(tract) 
63,100 Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Busso 
and Kline (2008) 
6 New Markets Tax Credit US Subsidised capital investment in low-income 
neighborhoods. 
RDD Area 
(tract) 
50,820 Freedman (2012) 
7 Small Business 
Administration loans 
US Guaranteed and partially-guaranteed loans up to 
$5.5m for small businesses. 
IV Firm 22,781 Brown and Earle (2017) 
8 Law 488/91 Italy Capital subsidies to businesses in least-developed 
regions. 
RDD Firm 42,638 Pellegrini and Muccigrosso (2017) 
9 Law 488/91 Italy Capital subsidies to businesses in least-developed 
regions. 
RDD Firm 68,409 Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) 
 
Notes: Cost per job estimates have been converted from original units to US$ using yearly average exchange rates for the year that costs were reported for and then deflated 
to 2010 using a US consumer price index from the World Bank. Midpoints are taken where cost per job is reported as a range. In cases where base year is not stated, the last 
year of reported expenditures is taken. In the methods column: IV is instrumental variables, DD is differences-in-differences and RDD is regression discontinuity design.   If 
more than one source is cited, the first source provides the cost per job estimate based on job effects that are cited in the second source. 
 
